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Beyond Bailouts: Federal Tools for Preventing 
State Budget Crises† 
BRIAN GALLE* & KIRK J. STARK** 
More than two years after the official end of the Great Recession, state 
governments still face significant budget deficits that cannot be addressed without 
further drastic spending cuts or substantial revenue increases. The structural 
origins of the ongoing state fiscal crisis are well known. Excessively procyclical 
revenue structures, combined with spending obligations that increase with 
economic downturns, have resulted in a budget dynamic for the states that is not 
sustainable over the long term. The consensus solution to this problem is for states 
to save money during boom times (via budget stabilization or “rainy day” funds) 
and to draw on those savings during recessions. Unfortunately, numerous studies 
have shown that states do not save anywhere close to an adequate amount for this 
to be an effective strategy. As a result, during each of the past several downturns, 
states have turned to the federal government for fiscal assistance—often derisively 
termed “bailouts”—to address fiscal imbalances. Yet these bailouts have their own 
problems, including creating an incentive for states not to establish adequate rainy 
day funds, which in turn increases the likelihood of future bailout demands. 
To escape from this vicious cycle, we propose a set of federal policy reforms to 
facilitate state savings. We offer a menu of policy options, rather than a single 
solution, because we argue that existing evidence does not clearly explain why 
states do not save. Therefore, we first analyze the possible sources of failure and 
then tailor a number of remedies for each; in nearly all cases, it is clear that states 
would be unable to overcome the problem on their own, making federal 
intervention particularly apt. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite the end of the Great Recession more than two years ago, many state 
governments continue to face significant funding gaps.1 Legislatures across the 
country have cut programs and services, while also raising taxes, in an effort to 
satisfy state constitutional balanced-budget requirements.2 These actions grow out 
of an understandable instinct to make do with less, yet they intensify recessionary 
pressures on households and businesses, jeopardizing economic recovery and, 
paradoxically, exacerbating state budget problems.3 Worse still, current research 
has shown that state budget cuts during recessions tend to be steepest in social 
safety-net programs, with the result that households most affected by the economic 
downturn (that is , low- and moderate-income households) are hardest hit by state 
responses to budget shortfalls.4 In this Article, we propose and compare possible 
federal interventions to disrupt these dynamics and prevent states from contributing 
to future economic downturns. 
The cycle of recession-reinforcing budget crises is a recurring phenomenon in 
recent U.S. history.5 As we have explained in earlier work, state fiscal difficulties 
arise chiefly from structural changes in the composition of state tax bases and the 
nature of state expenditure obligations.6 State tax revenues are strongly 
procyclical—receipts vary with changes in the underlying economy, exhibiting 
swings from peak to trough more severe than would be expected from a tax system 
that merely tracked economic activity.7 The result is a rollercoaster pattern of tax 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Nicholas Johnson, Phil Oliff, & Erica Williams, An Update on State Budget Cuts: At 
Least 46 States Have Imposed Cuts That Hurt Vulnerable Residents and Cause Job Loss, 
CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 1–2 (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.cbpp.org/files/3-13-
08sfp.pdf. 
 2. See Monica Davey, Budget Worries Push Governors to Same Mind-Set, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 17, 2011, at A1. 
 3. See Jonathan Rodden & Erik Wibbels, Fiscal Decentralization and the Business 
Cycle: An Empirical Study of Seven Federations, 22 ECON. & POL. 37, 37 (2010) 
(demonstrating self-reinforcing effect of recessions and subnational budgets). 
 4. See David Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2614–40 
(2005). 
 5. Id. at 2611–14; Bob Zahradnik & Nick Johnson, State Rainy Day Funds: What to 
Do When it Rains?, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 7 (Jan. 31, 2002), 
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1539. 
 6. Brian Galle & Jonathan Klick, Recessions and the Social Safety Net: The Alternative 
Minimum Tax as a Countercyclical Fiscal Stabilizer, 63 STAN. L. REV. 187, 195–205 (2010); 
Kirk J. Stark, The Federal Role in State Tax Reform, 30 VA. TAX REV. 407, 419–23 (2010). 
 7. See Timothy Schiller, Riding the Revenue Roller Coaster: Recent Trends in State 
Government Finance, BUS. REV., First Quarter 2010, at 23, 23–30 (2010), 
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/business-review/2010/q1/ 
brq110_revenue-roller-coaster.pdf.  
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receipts that is notoriously susceptible to fiscal mismanagement. State and local 
spending also responds to the business cycle, with demands on social insurance 
programs in particular rising during economic downturns. The problem is easy to 
describe—the demand for public services goes up as revenues go down—but 
difficult to resolve. Private actors typically manage a divergence between receipts 
and expenditures through borrowing, saving, or some combination. Unfortunately, 
state and local governments face significant limitations on both fronts. 
As for borrowing, the ability of state residents to migrate to other jurisdictions 
limits the extent to which states can borrow against future resources. Unlike the 
federal government, state and local governments must be attentive to the risks of 
eroding their tax bases through the outmigration of taxpayers averse to excessive 
debt levels. This concern is especially acute with regard to the wealthiest taxpayers, 
who are both the most readily mobile segment of the population and the most likely 
to bear the burden of future debt repayment obligations. Even if taxpayer exit were 
not a constraint, most states are limited in their capacity to borrow because of 
constitutional limitations adopted out of fear of excessive debt.8 These limitations 
were enacted in part out of a concern that voters or officials could be present-
biased—that is, they may weigh the benefits of spending today more heavily than 
the cost of repaying tomorrow. Voters may be present biased either because they 
expect to move somewhere else before the bill comes due or because of a general 
psychological tendency to underestimate future costs. Officials are people too, and 
so could be subject to a similar psychological bias; they may also rationally expect 
that they will be out of office before the burden of debt repayment materializes. In 
recognition of the risks of excessive borrowing, most states have constitutional 
limitations on state indebtedness as well as some form of balanced-budget 
requirement. 
The most obvious strategy when faced with a need to smooth consumption in 
the face of borrowing constraints is to save when times are good. Indeed, the 
consensus solution advanced by most experts in the field of state and local public 
finance is for states to set aside additional revenues during periods of strong 
economic growth, thus obviating the need to borrow when revenues decline. In 
practice, however, this strategy has proved exceptionally difficult to implement.9 
States face difficulty saving for the same reason they might be inclined to borrow 
excessively: savings means giving up benefits today in order to reduce the pain of 
tomorrow. Even if some officials do manage to put money aside in budget 
stabilization (“rainy day”) funds, future officials may raid the funds for their own 
purposes. Fearing such an outcome, boom-year lawmakers understandably develop 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. Galle & Klick, supra note 6 at 200–04. For a fuller explanation of the points in this 
paragraph, see infra notes 7–51. 
 9. Russell S. Sobel & Randall G. Holcombe, The Impact of State Rainy Day Funds in 
Easing State Fiscal Crises During the 1990–1991 Recession, PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 28, 33 
(1996); Super, supra note 4, at 2611; Christian Gonzalez & Arik Levinson, State Rainy Day 
Funds and the State Budget Crisis of 2002-?, ST. TAX NOTES, Aug. 11, 2003, at 441, 444; 
see Justin Marlowe, Fiscal Slack and Counter-Cyclical Expenditure Stabilization: A First 
Look at the Local Level, 25 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 48, 50 (2005); see also Christian Y. 
Gonzalez & Vicente B. Paqueo, Social Sector Expenditures and Rainy-Day Funds 6 (World 
Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3131, 2003). 
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a “use it or lose it” mentality, reasoning that, if future actors are unlikely to use 
savings wisely, why save at all? Confirming these effects, empirical studies have 
shown existing rainy day funds to be inadequate to the task of sheltering state 
budgets from recessionary revenue declines.10 
The inability of states to smooth expenditures over the business cycle has 
implications beyond sound fiscal housekeeping. Ultimately, the pathologies of state 
budgeting imperil the project of federalism itself. State budget crises prompt 
demands for federal bailouts, as evidenced in the most recent federal stimulus 
package.11 Federal bailouts answer a short-term problem of how to maintain 
spending levels in a fiscal crunch, but they also risk undermining the goals of 
federalism. Most significantly, bailouts result in a softening of the budget constraint 
that states face. Each new bailout erodes the incentive for fiscal responsibility in the 
future, jeopardizing the supposed efficiency benefits of decentralization. Moreover, 
to the extent that federal bailouts come with strings attached (as is almost always 
the case), state fiscal autonomy is also compromised.12 Over time, if states cannot 
responsibly manage their own finances, there will be increasing pressure to return 
the task of revenue raising to the federal government. Centralized funding in turn 
implies either federal control over policy or legal controversy over the rules for 
disbursing federal grants.  
We propose to address these problems by designing a set of federal policies to 
encourage states to establish robust rainy day funds (RDFs) subject to restrictions 
on withdrawal except in the case of genuine fiscal emergency. The basic 
framework of our proposal is not without precedent. Over the past several decades, 
Congress has established a broad range of federal incentives to encourage 
household savings—such as Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and 401(k) 
plans. The problem that motivated those provisions is, in many ways, similar to that 
faced by state governments today, yet no such program to encourage state savings 
exists.  
Given the stakes for the national economy and the collective action problem 
facing states, federal intervention is both merited and necessary. Moreover, the 
problem in the United States is one largely of the federal government’s making. By 
devolving an increasing share of social insurance functions to states over the last 
two decades, Congress has rendered these programs increasingly vulnerable to the 
fiscal vicissitudes of the states13—a vulnerability that the national government, with 
its indifference to exit pressures and vastly superior borrowing capability, does not 
share.  
Surprisingly, despite the recurrence of state budget crises and the broad 
academic consensus in favor of rainy day funds, there is almost no scholarship in 
any discipline on how to design an RDF system that would actually work.14 One 
                                                                                                                 
 
 10. See sources cited in footnote 9. 
 11. See Robert P. Inman, States in Fiscal Distress, 6 REG’L ECON. DEV. 65, 65–66 
(2010), http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/red/2010/01/Inman.pdf. 
 12. Id. at 69–70. 
 13. See infra text accompanying notes 30–36. 
 14. To be sure, rainy day funds are not the only possible solution to state budget 
dilemmas. For example, David Gamage argues that states could alleviate some budgetary 
pressure by changing how they structure their tax systems. David Gamage, Preventing State 
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official at the Federal Reserve has written a brief conference paper proposing that 
states might establish a shared pool of emergency funds.15 That is a good starting 
point, although—as we discuss further below—in our view that approach is likely 
to be unworkable because of the moral hazard and common-pool problems it would 
create. Others have examined which features of state RDFs make them more or less 
effective.16 But as noted above, states have little incentive to adopt even effective 
policies. These problems suggest that federal intervention is likely needed, yet there 
has not been any analysis of how federal intervention could facilitate state savings.  
As a result, our effort here is in many ways preliminary, in that we hope that 
ours will be only the first of many efforts toward designing an efficacious RDF 
system. Because there is still much the scholarly community does not know about 
why RDFs fail, we cannot confidently claim that there is one perfect solution to the 
RDF problem. Instead, we start with first principles, attempting to diagnose more 
precisely the political failures that doom rainy day funds and suggesting alternative 
solutions for each possible failure. 
The central diagnostic problem in designing a federally supported RDF program 
is that it is unclear whether the current state failures are attributable to individual 
voters, state officials, or both.17 There are good reasons to think both groups are 
biased in favor of spending over savings. But there are also plausible theoretical 
arguments that either one might be willing to save under the right circumstances. 
Economic theory suggests that state budget surpluses should increase land values, 
providing an immediate financial reward at least for homeowners in responsible 
states. Similarly, studies find that RDFs improve a jurisdiction’s credit rating by 
lowering borrowing costs and thereby freeing up extra funds for officials to spend 
in the short term.18  
                                                                                                                 
Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal Volatility Problem, 98 CAL. L. REV. 749, 792–811 
(2010). As Gamage notes, however, rainy day funds would be the “first-best” solution—if 
they worked. Id. at 765–66.  
 15. Richard Mattoon, Creating a National State Rainy Day Fund: A Modest Proposal to 
Improve State Fiscal Performance (Fed’l Res. Bank of Chicago, Working Paper No. 20, 
2003). 
 16. Brian Knight & Arik Levinson, Rainy Day Funds and State Government Savings, 52 
NAT’L TAX J. 459, 468–69 (1999); Dean Stansel & David T. Mitchell, State Fiscal Crises: 
Are Rapid Spending Increases to Blame?, 28 CATO J. 435, 435, 445–46 (2008); Gary A. 
Wagner & Erick M. Elder, The Role of Budget Stabilization Funds in Smoothing 
Government Expenditures Over the Business Cycle, 33 PUB. FIN. REV. 439, 441, 459 (2005); 
see Antonio Fatás & Ilan Mihov, The Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal Rules in the US 
States, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 101, 111 (2006); Arik Levinson, Balanced Budgets and Business 
Cycles: Evidence from the States, 51 NAT’L TAX J. 715, 726–27 (1998); Sobel & Holcombe, 
supra note 9, at 37; see also Gonzalez & Paqueo, supra note 9, at 9; cf. James W. Douglas & 
Ronald Keith Gaddie, State Rainy Day Funds and Fiscal Crises: Rainy Day Funds and the 
1990–1991 Recession Revisited, 22 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. REV. 19, 25 (2002); Yilin Hou, 
Fiscal Reserves and State Own-Source Expenditure in Downturn Years, 33 PUB. FIN. REV. 
117, 130 (2005). 
 17. For explanation of the points in this paragraph, see infra text accompanying notes 
64–105. 
 18. Cleopatra Charles, The Impact of Budget Stabilization Funds on State General 
Obligation Bond Ratings, 31 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., no. 2, 2010, at 3, 12 (also finding that 
more stringent RDF rules “are associated with higher credit ratings”). 
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Identifying the sites of the political failures is important because it allows for 
better design of federal policies to encourage state savings. For instance, if voters 
favor RDFs but their representatives are incapable of satisfying that preference, a 
federal policy giving immediate benefits to elected officials, such as unrestricted 
grant funds, might flip the state officials’ incentives and trigger significant RDF 
utilization. On the other hand, if state officials would favor RDFs but the idea lacks 
popular support, it might be preferable to design a federal subsidy more directly 
targeted at reversing voter preferences, such as a federal income tax deduction set 
to the taxpayer’s per capita share of the state’s annual amount saved. 
It is also useful to understand why a particular failure happens. For example, we 
argue that the nature of present bias allows for the design of psychologically 
informed policy tools that could flip bias against itself. Thus, we suggest letting 
states “save more tomorrow,” as Thaler and Sunstein have suggested for individual 
savings toward retirement.19 Because present-biased officials will discount both the 
future costs of savings as well as the rewards, they may be willing to agree in the 
present to commit to saving in the future at a fraction of the cost of agreeing to start 
saving immediately. On the individual level, present bias can be used to get voters 
to reveal the extent of their preference for immediate rewards, allowing the 
government more easily to identify those who oppose savings policies. 
Again, though, savings are only half the story; there must also be mechanisms 
for protecting RDFs against premature “raids,” so that the resources set aside will 
be available when a recession hits. Accordingly, we also consider alternative 
methods of restricting RDF withdrawals. Allowing states to control their own 
funds, subject to federal approval of the state plan or federal penalties for early 
withdrawal, might permit more flexibility and innovation. But it also opens the 
door to rent-seeking and the pathologies of state budgeting. Alternately, granting 
control to federal officials can insulate RDFs from state politics albeit at the cost of 
particularized information about state needs. The optimal tradeoff therefore is hard 
to identify in the abstract; some experimentation is likely required. 
Part I of this Article will explain in more detail the causes of states’ budget 
woes, and why those problems call for national solutions. Part II attempts to 
diagnose why RDFs, despite their theoretical appeal, have failed to significantly 
improve states’ ability to weather economic downturns. Part III offers a menu of 
options for encouraging states to make contributions; our discussion is largely 
informal, but readers who desire some mathematical modeling can find it in the 
margins throughout this Part. Part IV similarly outlines the tradeoffs policy makers 
face in any effort to encourage states to retain money in their savings funds until 
recessions actually strike. We then conclude. 
I. THE CASE FOR STATE RAINY DAY FUNDS 
In a world where revenues perfectly matched expenditures there would be no 
need for borrowing or saving in order to maintain government spending obligations 
over time. Unfortunately, governments at all levels routinely face a mismatch 
                                                                                                                 
 
 19. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 114–19 (2d ed. 2009). 
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between inflows and outflows, and thus must confront the question of how to 
manage budget surpluses and deficits. At the state and local level, structural 
changes in the fiscal landscape over the past quarter century have led to increased 
volatility in both revenues and expenditures over the business cycle. It bears 
emphasizing that there is great variation among the states. With that caveat, 
however, certain general tendencies nevertheless clearly emerge.  
On the revenue side of the equation, key structural changes in state and local tax 
systems over the past three decades have resulted in a significant increase in 
revenue volatility over the business cycle. Numerous factors are no doubt at work, 
but three developments in particular deserve emphasis here. 
First, state and local governments have increased their reliance on personal 
income taxes significantly over the past three decades. Whereas in 1977 personal 
income taxes accounted for only 16.6% of total state and local tax revenues, by 
2007 they accounted for 22.5% of the total.20 Because income taxes generally 
exhibit greater variability over the business cycle than other taxes, this change in 
the composition of the tax base has increased the volatility of state and local tax 
receipts. Not surprisingly, concern about the effects of revenue volatility on state 
and local budgeting has been the greatest in states that have experienced the largest 
increase in reliance on personal income taxes. In California, for example, personal 
income taxes as a share of all state and local taxes nearly doubled over the past 
thirty years, increasing from 15.2% in 1977 to 30% in 2007.21 In part because of 
this shift, California has become the nation’s poster child for subnational fiscal 
turmoil.22 
A second, related development is the reduced reliance on property taxes. In 
1977, property taxes accounted for 35.5% of total state and local tax revenues, but 
by 2007 that figure had dropped to 30.3%.23 In effect, state and local governments 
have swapped out a portion of property tax revenues for income tax revenues. 
Because property taxes are a relatively stable source of revenue, this change has 
resulted in a more volatile tax mix for state and local governments. Again, there is 
substantial variation among the states worth noting. About a third of the states 
actually increased their reliance on property taxes from 1977 to 2007, including 
Texas and Florida (both of which have constitutional prohibitions on personal 
income taxes), but in the remaining states property taxes accounted for a smaller 
                                                                                                                 
 
 20. THE URBAN INSTITUTE-BROOKINGS INST. TAX POLICY CTR., 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/Content/PDF/dqs_table_49.pdf (2010). 
 21. State & Local Government Finance Data Query System. 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/slf-dqs/pages.cfm. The Urban Institute-Brookings Institution 
Tax Policy Center. Data from U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of State and Local 
Government Finances, Government Finances, Volume 4, and Census of Governments.  
 22. Stark, supra note 6, at 432–36; see also Robert Frank, The Price of Taxing the Rich, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2011, at C1; but see INST. ON TAX. & ECON. POL’Y, IN IT FOR THE 
LONG HAUL: WHY CONCERNS OVER PERSONAL INCOME TAX “VOLATILITY” ARE OVERBLOWN 
1 (2011), available at www.itepnet.org/pdf/volatility_0311.pdf. 
 23. State and Local Property Tax Revenue as a Percentage of Total Tax Revenue, 
Selected Years 1977-2009, THE URBAN INSTITUTE-BROOKINGS INST. TAX POLICY CTR. 
[hereinafter State and Local Property Tax], http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/Content/ 
PDF/dqs_table_83.pdf. 
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share of total taxes in 2007 than in 1977.24 California, the epicenter of the property 
tax revolt in the mid-1970s with its famed Proposition 13, dramatically reduced its 
reliance on the property tax over the ensuing three decades.25 In 1977, the year 
before Proposition 13 was approved by California voters, property tax revenues 
accounted for 42.1% of the Golden State’s total tax revenue; by 2007, that figure 
had dropped to 27%.26 
Finally, a substantial nationwide increase in income inequality over the past 
thirty years has resulted in an ever larger share of personal income tax revenues 
coming from high-income households. This well-documented shift is evident in 
numerous statistical measures. For example, the Gini coefficient for U.S. 
households, perhaps the most common measure of income inequality, increased 
from .402 in 1977 to .463 in 2007.27 Perhaps more intuitively, the share of total 
income earned by the top 5% of the income distribution increased significantly 
over this period, rising from 16.8% in 1977 to 21.2% in 2007.28 In other words, just 
as state and local governments were retreating from the property tax, the income 
tax base into which they were shifting was becoming increasingly concentrated in a 
smaller number of households. One important effect of this shift was that state and 
local budgets became more and more sensitive to the economic fortunes of the 
country’s highest earners. Unlike low- and middle-income households, wealthy 
households derive a substantial share of their income from notoriously volatile 
sources, such as capital gains, dividends, restricted stock, and stock options. As one 
of California’s most highly regarded revenue forecasters remarked, “‘[w]e built a 
large part of our government on the state’s most unstable income group.’”29 
Structural changes in the composition of state and local government 
expenditures have likewise contributed to the sensitivity of state and local budgets 
to the business cycle. State and local governments are major providers of social 
insurance in the United States.30 Although federal rules often set out the basic 
framework for the various tools of social insurance, subnational governments 
supply much of the money and policy detail.31 Unemployment insurance, Medicaid, 
supplemental nutrition programs, and temporary assistance to needy families 
                                                                                                                 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Robert W. Wassmer, California’s State and Local Revenue Structure after 
Proposition 13: Is Denial the Appropriate Way to Copy?, in STATE AND LOCAL FISCAL 
POLICY: THINKING OUTSIDE THE BOX? 98, 98 (Sally Wallace ed., 2010) (noting the dramatic 
reduction in California’s reliance on the property tax post-Prop 13). 
 26. State and Local Property Tax, supra note 23. 
 27. Table H-4. Gini Ratios for Households, by Race and Hispanic Origin of 
Householder: 1967 to 2009, Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic 
Supplements, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/ 
historical/inequality/index.html. 
 28. Id. at Table H-2. Share of Aggregate Income Received by Each Fifth and Top 5 
Percent of Households, All Races: 1967 to 2009. 
 29. Frank, supra note 22. 
 30. DIANA M. DINITTO, SOCIAL WELFARE: POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 27 (7th ed. 
2011). 
 31. Kenneth Finegold, The United States: Federalism and Its Counter-Factuals, in 
FEDERALISM AND THE WELFARE STATE: NEW WORLD AND EUROPEAN EXPERIENCES 138, 152–
59 (Herbert Obinger, Stephen Leibfried, & Francis G. Castles, eds., 2005). 
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(TANF) all rely heavily on state administration, albeit with substantial fiscal 
support and guidance from the federal government.32 
The trend since the 1980s has been to shift responsibility for social insurance 
downwards.33 Defenders of this “devolution revolution” emphasize the federalism 
benefits that can come with local administration: a closer match between local 
preferences and the extent of social insurance offered, greater flexibility, and 
perhaps greater experimentation and responsiveness.34 Cynics note that the shift 
also eases budget pressures on Congress.35 Whatever the explanation, the 
devolution of social insurance programs has increasingly exposed the system to the 
volatility of state budgets.36  
State budgeting differs from national budgeting in several crucial respects. 
Perhaps most importantly, states cannot print their own money.37 As a result, this 
age-old method of raising revenue via currency debasement is simply not available 
to state governments. Two other factors, though, account for many of the 
differences we focus on here. First, interstate migration of both households and 
firms is relatively common in the United States.38 Second, citizens of one state do 
not vote in other states, with the result that each state’s officials have little reason to 
care about the impact of their actions on residents of other jurisdictions.39 In 
contrast, it is very costly to leave the United States altogether, and the national 
government is relatively more sensitive to the welfare of the entire country.40 
The first factor, the threat of exit, has made it challenging for states, and 
especially local governments, to raise money to pay for social insurance during 
recessions. Many studies have shown that taxpayers consider relative burdens when 
deciding where to live or do business.41 Further, the credible threat of exit also 
                                                                                                                 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Super, supra note 4, at 2575–76; see Andrew Reschovsky, The Impact of State 
Government Fiscal Crises on Local Governments and Schools, 36 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 
86, 86–102 (2004). 
 34. E.g., Michael S. Greve, Big Government Federalism, AEI OUTLOOKS, at 5–6 (Mar. 
2001), http://www.aei.org/docLib/Big%20Government%20Federalism.pdf. 
 35. Super, supra note 4, at 2584–85. 
 36. Thomas L. Gais, Stretched Net: The Retrenchment of State and Local Social Welfare 
Spending Before the Recession, 39 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 557, 564, 573–74 (2009); see 
Super, supra note 4, at 2591–93 (explaining sources of state vulnerability to federal aid 
reductions). 
 37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 38. For individuals, see William A.V. Clark & Suzanne Davies Withers, Family 
Migration and Mobility Sequences in the United States: Spatial Mobility in the Context of 
the Life Course, 17 DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 591, 592 (2007). For firms, see Jeffrey A. Frankel, 
Measuring International Capital Mobility: A Review, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 197, 197–202 
(1992). 
 39. Clayton P. Gillette, Can Public Debt Enhance Democracy?, 50 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 937, 976–77 (2008). 
 40. Todd E. Pettys, The Mobility Paradox, 92 GEO. L.J. 481, 519–20 (2004). 
 41. See, e.g., Richard J. Cebula, Internal Migration Determinants: Recent Evidence, 11 
INT’L ADVANCES ECON. IN RES. 267, 272 (2005) (reporting that cost of living affects 
migration patterns); Michael P. Devereux & Rachel Griffith, Taxes and the Location of 
Production: Evidence from a Panel of US Multinationals, 68 J. PUB. ECON. 335, 335, 351–58 
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gives additional political voice to the most mobile.42 For similar reasons, states also 
cannot easily borrow; since public debt augurs higher future taxes, large debt 
burdens, too, create exit pressure.43 
Present bias and other forms of externalities also lead to a political environment 
that heavily curtails state borrowing. Present bias is simply the tendency of an 
individual to favor the present over the future, and in the fiscal context, it can result 
either from either political or psychological factors.44 Politically, voters and 
officials may both anticipate that they will not be around when the future comes: 
they may die, they may move, or they may be voted or term-limited out of office, 
so that the future costs represent an intertemporal externality.45 Evidence suggests 
that individuals are often unable to resist the temptation to live for today, even if 
our objective preference would be to plan for tomorrow.46 Present bias manifests 
itself in policymaking at all levels of government, but it is arguably more acute at 
the subnational level because of the prospect of interjurisdictional mobility. At the 
state and local level, the present is separated from the future not only by time but 
                                                                                                                 
(1998); Peter John, Keith Dowding, & Stephen Biggs, Residential Mobility in London: A 
Micro-Level Test of the Behavioural Assumptions of the Tiebout Model, 25 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 
379, 379 (1995) (“Taxes and services are found to be important factors in the moving 
decision . . . .”); Joseph M. Phillips & Ernest P. Goss, The Effect of State and Local Taxes on 
Economic Development: A Meta-Analysis, 62 S. ECON. J. 320, 320, 323–29 (1995); Hui 
Shan, Property Taxes and Elderly Mobility, 67 J. URB. ECON. 194, 194 (2010) (finding that 
rising property taxes cause older households to relocate).  
 42. Gillette, supra note 39, at 966; see William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The 
New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best 
World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 264–65 (1997); see also Emmanuelle Reulier & Yvon Rocaboy, 
Regional Tax Competition: Evidence from French Regions, 43 REGIONAL STUD. 915 (2009) 
(finding that main source of pressure on individual income tax rates in competing localities 
is ability of individuals to compare their own rates against neighbors and threaten to punish 
underperforming officials). 
 43. Galle & Klick, supra note 6, at 198–200; see Barry Bosworth & Gary Burtless, 
Pension Reform and Saving, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 703, 717–18 (2004) (interpreting their own 
empirical findings on unfunded pension obligations as supporting this argument). 
 44. For a technical definition, see Jess Benhabib, Alberto Bisin & Andrew Schotter, 
Present-Bias, Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting, and Fixed Costs, 69 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 
205, 205–06 (2010). To see present bias mathematically, suppose that we represent an 
agent’s subjective present value of future consumption as βc, where δ is a standard discount 
rate, such as is produced by a market rate of interest, and beta is a special discount, between 
0 and 1, that the individual applies only to future consumption. A rational, unbiased actor 
allocating resources across time maximizes current consumption subject to future 
consumption, u1 + δu2 + δ2u3 + . . . δnun. But the present-biased actor excessively discounts 
future consumption, maximizing instead u1 +β δu2 + βδ2u3 +. . . βδnun.  
 45. Gary A. Wagner, Political Control and Public Sector Savings: Evidence from the 
States, 109 PUB. CHOICE 149, 150 (2001); Michael Wolkoff, An Evaluation of Municipal 
Rainy Day Funds, 7 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 52, 61 (1987). 
 46. GEORGE AINSLIE, PICOECONOMICS: THE STRATEGIC INTERACTION OF SUCCESSIVE 
MOTIVATIONAL STATS WITHIN THE PERSON 63–80 (1992); Richard H. Thaler, Some 
Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency, in QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS 127, 128 
(Richard H. Thaler ed., 1991). 
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also, potentially, by space. It may be perfectly rational for those who anticipate a 
future elsewhere not to fully internalize the cost of future debt payments.47 
Present bias should predictably lead to excessive borrowing, which 
paradoxically is why state borrowing is so difficult.48 Borrowing offers rewards 
today, such as the opportunity for officials to buy off important constituencies, or 
offer incentives for mobile taxpayers to relocate to their jurisdiction; the costs 
arrive only later, perhaps after the official is out of power. However, over time 
electorates, recognizing this dynamic, have imposed significant restrictions on 
public officials, such as constitutional debt limitations and balanced budget 
requirements.49  
These limitations necessarily (and intentionally) make it difficult for states to 
rely on borrowing as a strategy for smoothing government expenditures over the 
business cycle. In combination with the increased volatility of state revenue 
structures discussed above, restrictions on subnational borrowing exacerbate fiscal 
distress during economic downturns.50 Revenue declines associated with cyclical 
variability in the economy are naturally to be expected, but states have a limited 
range of policy instruments available to them to weather the storm. Often the only 
choice that states have is to curtail governmental services. Historically, the deepest 
recessionary cuts have been exactly in those areas most needed during recessions: 
social insurance and aid to the poor.51  
These facts would seem to set up a strong case for federal intervention. Since the 
national government faces much weaker exit pressures, it has more freedom to use 
taxes to pay for social insurance during downturns.52 While the same present bias 
described above no doubt exerts an influence at the national level as well, the 
federal government has never bound its own borrowing capacity as tightly as the 
states, perhaps because present bias is lower, or because a central government faces 
less pressure to borrow in order to compete with its neighbors.53 National budgeting 
also allows for fiscal diversification; regions that are less impacted by a downturn 
can support those that are in greater need.54 Even if states did not face taxing and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 47. Levinson, supra note 16, at 716.  
 48. Galle & Klick, supra note 6, at 200–04. 
 49. Levinson, supra note 16, at 717. There are other forces, such as political and bond 
market pressures, that limit borrowing as well. See Douglas & Gaddie, supra note 16, at 20. 
On state constitutional debt limitations, see D. Roderick Kiewiet and Kristin Szakaly, 
Constitutional Limitations on Borrowing: An Analysis of State Bonded Indebtedness, 12 J. L. 
ECON. & ORG. 62, 67 tbl.1 (1996). 
 50. Hou, supra note 16, at 123; Levinson, supra note 16, at 717–19; Gary A. Wagner & 
Erick M. Elder, Revenue Cycles and the Distribution of Shortfalls in U.S. States: 
Implications for an “Optimal” Rainy Day Fund, 60 NAT’L TAX J. 727, 728 (2007). 
 51. Super, supra note 4, at 2614–40. 
 52. See Kirk J. Stark, Fiscal Federalism and Tax Progressivity: Should the Federal 
Government Encourage State and Local Redistribution?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1389, 1408–10 
(2004) (describing debate over this issue, and noting evidence in favor of conclusion that 
decentralized redistribution is difficult). 
 53. See Nancy C. Staudt, Constitutional Politics and Balanced Budgets, 1998 U.ILL. L. 
REV. 1105, 1106–10 (noting failure of various efforts to enact federal balanced budget 
requirement). 
 54. Levinson, supra note 16, at 724. 
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borrowing constraints, they might still spend inadequately on social insurance from 
a national perspective.55 State economies are heavily intertwined56—recessions in 
New York hurt New Jersey and Connecticut, too—but each state has little incentive 
to take neighboring welfare into account when deciding how much to spend.  
Unfortunately, existing forms of federal support for struggling states have 
serious flaws. Discretionary federal supports, such as the most recent stimulus bill, 
often miss the mark in their timing and size, and they may demand substantial 
amounts of inefficient spending—for example, pork-barrel spending—to win 
passage.57 Automatically triggered responses, such as David Super’s suggestion of 
variable federal subsidies for state unemployment assistance in an amount 
determined by local need, are difficult to design, in part because they represent a 
kind of bailout.58 Since states know that they are insured against losses, they may 
take less care to avoid fiscal disaster.59 The federal tax system does already (and 
accidentally) include a version of this automatic bailout, but as recent experience 
demonstrates, even that has not prevented major suffering at the state level during 
downturns.60 Finally, ongoing supports, such as Canada’s revenue-sharing system, 
might encourage excessive state spending, especially during boom times.61  
One largely unexplored alternative to these designs is to encourage states to 
save, rather than borrow. As many other commentators have recognized, if states 
could save effectively when times are good they would have little need to borrow 
when times are bad.62 A typical vehicle for state savings is the RDF. The state 
                                                                                                                 
 
 55. See Robert P. Inman, Transfers and Bailouts: Enforcing Local Fiscal Discipline 
with Lessons from U.S. Federalism, in FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGE OF 
HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 35, 45–47 (Jonathan Rodden, Gunnar S. Eskeland & Jennie 
Litvack eds., 2003) (discussing extraterritorial effects of local fiscal failures); see also 
Tamim Bayoumi & Barry Eichengreen, Restraining Yourself: The Implications of Fiscal 
Rules for Economic Stabilization, 42 IMF STAFF PAPERS 32, 46 (1995) (“[S]tate budgets 
played a significant role in macroeconomic stabilization in the 1970s and 1980s . . . .”). 
 56. See Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Can We Decentralize Our 
Unemployment Policies? Evidence from the United States, 54 KYKLOS 287, 301 (2001); see 
also Thomas A. Garrett, Gary A. Wagner, & David C. Wheelock, Regional Disparities in the 
Spatial Correlation of State Income Growth, 1977–2002, 41 ANNALS REGIONAL SCI. 601, 
601–18 (2007) (measuring influence of U.S. state growth on neighbors’ economies). More 
generally, neighboring economies of any kind exert strong impacts on the success of trading 
partners. See generally Ramon Moreno & Bharat Trehan, Location and the Growth of 
Nations, 2 J. ECON. GROWTH 399, 399–418 (1997). 
 57. Jeff Strnad, Some Macroeconomic Interactions with Tax Base Choice, 56 SMU L. 
REV. 171, 180 (2003). 
 58. Galle & Klick, supra note 6, at 205–07. 
 59. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and 
Moral Hazard, 64 ECONOMETRICA 623, 629–35 (1996). 
 60. Galle & Klick, supra note 6, at 210–35. 
 61. See Kirk J. Stark, Rich States, Poor States: Assessing the Design and Effectiveness 
of a U.S. Fiscal Equalization Regime, 63 TAX L. REV. 957, 959 (2010); see 2 DEP’T OF 
TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 63–64 (1984) 
(making this point about federal deductibility of state taxes).  
 62. Inman, supra note 11, at 78; see Wagner & Elder, supra note 16, at 441; see also 
Philip G. Joyce, What’s So Magical About Five Percent? A Nationwide Look at Factors that 
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simply sets aside a portion of its unused tax revenues in an account, with some 
limitations on the account to prevent the money there from being spent, except in a 
time of fiscal need.63 If the federal government could encourage long-term use of 
RDFs, the flaws of all the other federal mechanisms could be avoided.  
Of course, one might wonder, if RDFs are so great, why it should be that states 
need any encouragement to embrace them. We turn now to that question; in the 
Parts that follow, we analyze potential federal solutions to the failures we identify. 
II. FAILURES OF EXISTING RAINY DAY FUND DESIGNS 
In the presence of revenue volatility and borrowing constraints, rainy day funds 
have an obvious appeal as a potential method of smoothing government 
expenditures over the business cycle. Unfortunately, experience shows that existing 
funds have thus far failed to live up to their promise. In Part II.A., we explore some 
of the possible explanations for why states have not adequately utilized RDFs. 
Identifying the fault lines is critical, because even if states cannot correct flaws on 
their own, it may be possible to design federal policies that will make RDFs a more 
viable tool for smoothing state and local government spending over the business 
cycle. 
A. Understanding the Failure of State RDFs 
Although nearly every state has some form of RDF, studies have shown that 
they have been inadequate in sheltering state budgets from recessionary revenue 
declines.64 This is not to suggest that there is nothing to learn from state experience 
with RDFs. A few public finance scholars have begun to examine cross-state 
variation in the design of state RDFs in an effort to determine which features are 
most likely to predict RDF balances at a level adequate to protect against 
recessionary revenue declines. For example, RDFs vary in their rules both for when 
a state must make contributions to the fund as well as rules for when funds can be 
withdrawn.65 In general, studies have shown that a combination of strict rules 
requiring states to make contributions to their funds, together with rules limiting 
when legislatures are allowed to make withdrawals, seems to be the most effective 
mechanism for ensuring the efficacy of the fund.66 Unfortunately, the combination 
of binding deposit requirements and withdrawal restrictions is rare.67  
                                                                                                                 
Influence the Optimal Size of State Rainy Day Funds, PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., 62, 79–82 
(2001); see also Super, supra note 4, at 2643–44. 
 63. Gary A. Wagner & Russell S. Sobel, State Budget Stabilization Fund Adoption: 
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177, 180 (2006); see Hou, supra note 16, at 120 (discussing the role of budget stabilization 
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 64. See sources cited supra note 9.  
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These results suggest that RDFs suffer from many of the same problems of 
present bias discussed above. When lawmakers are not legally obligated to deposit 
funds into a budget stabilization fund, they tend not to do so. In addition, legal 
ambiguity regarding the circumstances in which RDF balances may be accessed are 
typically resolved in favor of withdrawal. Only when states tie their own hands and 
force themselves to save are they able to forego present consumption (understood 
here as either increased spending or reduced taxes) in order to augment RDF 
balances. It is not clear whether the source of this present bias results from the 
incentives of officials, of individual voters, or both. Studies to date have not 
focused on that question, although some of them offer some evidence one way or 
another, as we will now explain. 
1. Individual Voters 
While there is some polling evidence to suggest popular support for RDFs,68 
there are several reasons to expect a state’s residents to be skeptical about the value 
of such funds. As with borrowing, some voters may be excessively present-focused 
and thus inclined to favor current spending (or tax cuts) over saving for a rainy day. 
Moreover, the chief benefit of robust RDF balances—that is, the economic stability 
derived from avoiding drastic service cutbacks in the face of recessionary revenue 
declines—is in the nature of a public good, so that one would expect there rarely 
will be a coherent political constituency in favor of budget stability for its own 
sake.69 Even those with the strongest preferences for state savings may see little 
value in insisting on more robust RDFs if they fear that fund balances will not be 
used for their intended purposes.70 It is well established that long-term budgetary 
commitments require the support of durable political coalitions, and the 
maintenance of such coalitions is costly.71 To ensure that RDFs serve their intended 
function, proponents must invest in continual oversight and lobbying, making the 
potential costs to them of preserving savings in the long term prohibitively high.72 
There is one sense in which individuals might be expected to internalize the 
benefits of RDFs. To the extent that fiscal stability (or, framed differently, the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 68. See What’s Next California? DELIBERATIVE POLL 6 (June 24–26, 2011), 
http://cdd.stanford.edu/polls/california/2011/nextca-results.pdf. 
 69. Cf. Gillette, supra note 39, at 955 (making this point about misuse of public funds). 
A “public good” is one for which the purchase by one person allows others also to consume 
it. Thus, each individual has an incentive to free ride on the purchase by others, resulting in 
lower than optimal consumption overall.  
 70. This is an application of the general problem that any political coalition must 
account for the possibility of future changes in determining how much effort to exert in 
pushing for legislative change. Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary on 
“Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies”: Administrative 
Process and Organizational Form as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs, 75 VA. L. REV. 
499, 503, 505 (1989). 
 71. Cf. Staudt, supra note 53, at 1160–63 (explaining ease with which politicians may 
renege on budget commitments). 
 72. See Horn & Shepsle, supra note 70, at 503–07 (explaining strategic interactions 
between officials and constituents when laws are subject to revision).  
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absence of instability) is valued by incoming households and businesses, it is 
possible that an effective RDF could be reflected in increased property values (and 
thus home prices and local rents). If government indebtedness implies higher future 
taxes, and a corresponding impairment of property values,73 then excess funds 
stored in an RDF should imply the opposite—that is, property values should rise on 
the prospect of lower future tax burdens made possible by RDF balances.74 In 
effect, the “capitalization” of RDF balances into property values enables current 
residents to realize in the present some of the future benefits of savings.75 In theory, 
the most direct beneficiaries of capitalization (homeowners and other owners of 
immobile factors) might even lobby against premature raids of RDF balances in 
order to protect the value of their assets. To the extent that RDF balances are 
capitalized into property values, this would also reduce the credibility of exit 
threats by homeowners demanding immediate expenditures since rising home 
values are objective evidence that the jurisdiction is becoming more, not less, 
desirable.76 But typically the homeowner story is more powerful in local rather than 
state politics, which may explain why it has not significantly impacted state-level 
savings so far. 77  
2. Official Incentives  
In a similar fashion, theory offers conflicting predictions about official 
preferences for RDF savings. Once again the uncertainty derives chiefly from the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 73. See Reiner Eichenberger and David Stadelmann, How Federalism Protects Future 
Generations from Today’s Public Debts, 6 REV. L. & ECON. 395, 396 (2010) (reporting 
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 74. See Wallace E. Oates, The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on 
Property Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis, 77 J. 
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political force. 
 75. Cf. Oded Palmon & Barton A. Smith, New Evidence on Property Tax 
Capitalization, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1099, 1099–100, 1106 (1998) (reporting new and prior 
evidence that housing values reflect future tax liabilities). 
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result in higher property taxes. See Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, Do Caps on Increases in Assessed 
Values Create a Lock-in Effect? Evidence from Florida’s Amendment One, 64 NAT’L TAX J. 
7, 19–20 (2011). 
 77. For contrasting views on the homeowner cohesion point, compare WILLIAM A. 
FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 73–76 (2001) (arguing 
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geographic ties to be a cohesive unit) with Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—
Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 400–22 (1990) (describing situations in 
which this social cohesion breaks down). 
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problem of officials’ limited-time horizon: to the extent that public officials expect 
to have a limited time in office, they may favor current spending (or reduced taxes) 
over a robust RDF, especially if saving would simply transfer funds to their 
political rivals.78 This view has some empirical support.79 And just as the 
opportunity to borrow against future revenue creates a common pool from which 
officials may race to fish, an existing RDF balance is also a shared resource subject 
to the pressures of competitive depletion.80 These factors do not bode well for the 
success of state RDFs. 
Pointing in the other direction is the possibility that RDF balances might lower 
the state’s cost of borrowing. Gary Wagner, for example, finds that states with the 
most restrictive RDF rules have higher RDF balances and pay lower interest rates 
on general obligation bonds.81 Wagner argues that this relation is causal and that 
RDF balances effectively serve as a security deposit for bondholders in that they 
represent funds available for debt repayment.82 In support of this view is the fact 
that the major municipal bond credit-rating agencies consider RDF balances when 
rating issuer creditworthiness.83 Since higher bond ratings translate directly into 
lower interest rates,84 this implies that RDF contributions could well lower the cost 
of public borrowing. Present-biased officials, therefore, can capture at least a 
portion of the value of any savings through reduced current-year debt service 
expenses.85 Lower borrowing costs also will typically allow legislatures to borrow 
more under their own budgeting rules, again expanding the resources available 
immediately to legislators.86 
                                                                                                                 
 
 78. See Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and 
Government Debt, 57 REV. ECON. STUD. 403, 412 (1990); Lars P. Feld & Gebhard 
Kirschgässner, Does Direct Democracy Reduce Public Debt? Evidence from Swiss 
Municipalities, 109 PUB. CHOICE 347, 350 (2001); cf. H. Abbie Erler, Legislative Term 
Limits and State Spending, 133 PUB. CHOICE 479, 486–88 (2007) (finding that legislative 
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 79. See Chara Dalle Nogare & Roberto Ricciuti, Term Limits: Do They Really Affect 
Fiscal Policy Choices? 4 (CESifo Grp., Working Paper No. 2199, 2008) (surveying other 
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 80. See Wagner, supra note 45, at 150; Barry R. Weingast, Kenneth A. Shepsle, & 
Christopher Johnsen, The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach 
to Distributive Politics, 89 J. POL. ECON. 642, 642–64 (1981). 
 81. See Wagner, supra note 65, at 786; see also Charles, supra note 18, at 3, 12 (also 
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 82. See Wagner, supra note 65, at 789; see also Mattoon, supra note 15, at 2. 
 83. See Mattoon, supra note 15, at 5, 8. 
 84. See Craig L. Johnson & Kenneth A. Kriz, Impact of Three Credit Ratings on Interest 
Cost of State GO Bonds, 23 MUN. FIN. J. 1, 1–16 (2002). 
 85. For a more formal model, see Wagner, supra note 45, at 155–57.  
 86. See Yilin Hou & Daniel L. Smith, A Framework for Understanding State Balanced 
Budget Requirement Systems: Reexamining Distinctive Features and an Operational System, 
PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 22, 38–39 (2006) (noting most states require that revenues meet all 
expenditures). For a general overview of state budgeting matters, including a discussion of 
balanced budget provisions, see NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, NCSL 
FISCAL BRIEF: STATE BALANCED BUDGET PROVISIONS (2010), available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/StateBalancedBudgetProvisions2010.pdf. 
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Another possible mechanism for officials to translate the future gains of savings 
into present utility is by using RDF contributions as a credible signal of fiscal 
prudence. Although we are not aware of any scholarly analysis of the signaling 
effect of RDFs, in theory they should send a signal of fiscal prudence to inside and 
outside monitors of the jurisdiction’s officials. Thus, RDFs can serve elected 
officials in much the way payment of dividends serves firm managers, as a costly 
(and therefore credible) signal of individual performance.87  
In addition to signaling sound fiscal stewardship skills, RDF contributions may 
also credibly reveal to voters that the official is a good “type”—that is, that the 
official values voters’ long-term interests over the official’s political self-interest.88 
Ordinarily, voters who value the state’s long-term fiscal health have no easy way of 
judging which politicians feel similarly, except through after-the-fact 
retrospection.89 And history suggests that officials can easily manipulate these 
kinds of ex-post evaluations.90 Thus, RDF contributions allow the politician to 
signal fiscal responsibility to such voters more credibly than with the cheap talk of 
a mere promise. 
As a caveat to these points, we note that the signaling value of RDF 
contributions is likely to be dominated by the signaling value of tax cuts. In the 
same way that RDF contributions put resources beyond the control of current 
lawmakers, and thus serve as a costly signal of an ability to “make do with less,” 
officials may use their support of tax cuts as a signal of fiscal rectitude. Tax 
reductions likewise involve relinquishing control over resources, with the possible 
(though debatable) implication being that the official’s management has been so 
efficient that additional funds are unneeded. Alternately, the act of giving up 
control over the funds could imply that the official is not self-serving but instead is 
looking out for the interests of constituents. Unlike a rainy day fund, however, the 
tax cut returns money to the immediate use of the voter.91 Thus, the political 
rewards for enacting a tax cut seem likely to outweigh those for funding an RDF.92  
                                                                                                                 
 
 87. Corporate finance scholars hypothesize that corporate officers pay dividends in 
order to signal credibly to shareholders the officers’ success: the manager is so confident of 
her position that she does not need to horde cash to protect against buyouts, and she is so 
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money than use it for her own idiosyncratic ends. Because talk is cheap, such claims would 
be meaningless unless backed up by an actual costly sacrifice on the part of the manager; 
thus the manager’s sacrifice of her own use of the money makes the signal credible. See 
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fiscal policy for their own benefit). 
 89. See Alberto Alesina, Filipe R. Campante, and Guido Tabellini, Why Is Fiscal Policy 
Often Procyclical?, 6 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 1006, 1012–13 (2008). 
 90. Staudt, supra note 53, at 1160–63. 
 91. A rainy day fund is indistinguishable from a tax cut under perfect Ricardian 
equivalence, but perfect equivalence is unlikely at the state level because taxpayers can 
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3. Federal Intervention 
Some commentators have also suggested that central governments are somewhat 
to blame for fiscal irresponsibility by their subnational components.93 In this story, 
the states expect that federal taxpayers will offer them a “bailout” if any state’s 
finances crater. Because state recessions harm neighboring states as well as the 
federal fisc, a state could calculate that even purely self-interested neighboring 
officials would have reasons to help the state when it is in need.94 As we mentioned 
earlier, implicit insurance of this kind could contribute to moral hazard, leading 
states to take fewer precautions to protect themselves against downturns. Since 
rainy day funds are one form of precaution states could choose, the possibility of 
federal bailouts may itself be a factor that undermines states’ willingness to save. 
Evidence on whether this form of moral hazard is a serious problem in the 
United States is mixed. One leading public finance economist has argued that the 
United States is fairly unique in its ability to credibly threaten that it will not bail 
out failing states.95 On the other hand, Europe’s recent sovereign debt troubles can 
arguably be traced to the assumption by Euro currency member nations that the 
remainder of the EU would bail them out in the event of a crisis.96  
Another potential piece of U.S. evidence is the state’s response to an existing 
savings program, which is embedded in the unemployment insurance finance 
system. Both state and federal governments tax employers to cover the costs of 
unemployment insurance (UI).97 States that deplete their available UI funds can 
borrow from the federal fund.98 States that take more than a year to repay face a 
modest interest charge, and if they fail to repay within two years then employers in 
their state are subject to an extra charge of twenty-one dollars per employee per 
year in federal UI taxes.99 The twenty-one dollar figure is a small fraction—less 
than 10% on average—of the tax most employers pay.100 In short, the federal UI 
fund offers reinsurance to states through a common pool, with only a mild penalty, 
payable in the future, for overuse of the insurance. 
Qualitative studies of state UI funding show significant evidence of moral 
hazard. States routinely underfund their UI pools, and this is generally true even of 
                                                                                                                 
relocate. See Levinson, supra note 16, at 716.  
 92. Cf. Mattoon, supra note 15, at 3 (quoting Wisconsin assemblyman calling RDF an 
“over-taxation fund.”). 
 93. E.g., Persson & Tabellini, supra note 59, at 629–35. 
 94. See Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 56, at 301 (noting interdependence of regional 
labor markets). 
 95. Inman, supra note 55, at 59–62. 
 96. E.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring Options: An Analytical 
Comparison, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 301, 302–03 (2012). 
 97. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-440, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
TRUST FUNDS: LONG-STANDING STATE FINANCING POLICIES HAVE INCREASED RISK OF 
INSOLVENCY 4–5 (2010). 
 98. Id. at 7–8. 
 99. NAT’L EMPL. L. PROJECT, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE FINANCING IN CRISIS: HOW 
SHOULD STATES RESPOND TO TRUST FUND INSOLVENCY? 1, 6 (2010), 
http://www.nelp.org/page/-/UI/StateSolvencyStrategies.pdf?nocdn=1?nocdn=1. 
 100. Id. at 6 (reporting that average tax nationwide is about $275 per worker). 
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states that provide less generous UI benefits.101 The federal penalty for default has 
not changed since 1983, and, of course, the real value of twenty-one dollars has 
declined significantly since then.102 During that time span, states’ contributions to 
their own funds have declined, and state borrowing against the federal fund has 
increased sharply.103 Many states have explicitly shifted to a “pay-as-you-go” 
policy, which means that the state is simply refusing to save in advance for 
recession-driven spikes in UI claims.104 In effect, states are planning to borrow 
against the federal fund and deferring to the future the costs of repaying the 
resulting loans.105 It is possible, though, that these failings are unique to the design 
of the UI system. Less formal “bailout” expectations in which the pool of funds is 
not expressly limited, and the penalties are not predefined as so low, might not 
produce moral hazard to the same degree. 
Accordingly, although we know that states do not use RDFs effectively, the 
precise reasons for that failure remain unclear. However, if political breakdowns 
could be identified more precisely, it should be possible to design policy 
interventions to remedy those particular failures. In the ensuing Parts, we sketch 
some possible interventions. We should note, though, that we do not seriously 
consider here the possibility of reducing or conditioning federal “bailouts.” Overall, 
although we regard states’ hopes for federal assistance as a serious potential 
contributor to the current failure of rainy day funds, we regard the question of 
whether the federal government should offer assistance to needy states—and if so, 
under what conditions—as so complex that it warrants separate treatment, which 
we reserve for future work. 
B. An Interstate Borrowing Pool? 
To our knowledge, the only other commentator to have considered the 
possibility of some sort of federal or interstate coordination of state RDFs is 
Richard Mattoon, a senior economist and economic advisor with the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago.106 Mattoon begins his analysis by emphasizing the 
potentially significant nationwide benefits of counter-cyclical state spending. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 101. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 97, at 9–23 (finding that crisis 
in state UI funding is due to funding shortfalls, not overly generous benefits); see NAT’L 
EMP. L. PROJECT, supra note 99, at 5, 7 (“[T]he roots of the trust fund crisis lay in short-
sighted financing decisions in the years leading up to the recession.”). 
 102. The penalty amount is a percentage of the “taxable wage base,” or the portion of 
each employee’s income that is subject to federal tax. See supra note 102, at 5–8. Neither the 
percentage nor the base of $7000 has changed since 1983. Id. at 5, 26. 
 103. Id. at 14–22. 
 104. See NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, supra note 99, at 6–8.  
 105. Cf. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 97, at 29 (claiming that federal 
loans “reduce the incentive for states to maintain robust trust funds”). 
 106. Mattoon, supra note 15, at 1. A proposal for “tax-base insurance” advanced by 
Akash Deep and Robert Lawrence is similar in spirit to Matoon’s proposal, though quite 
different in its operational details. See Akash Deep and Robert Lawrence, Stabilizing State 
and Local Budgets: A Proposal for Tax-Base Insurance (Brookings Inst., Discussion Paper 
2008-01, 2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/ 
06_tax_base_lawrence/ 06_tax_base_lawrence.pdf.  
618 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:599 
 
Accordingly, he proposes that “a national rainy day fund be established.”107 While 
we agree with the notion of federal support for state RDF funding, in our view 
Mattoon’s proposal has certain shortcomings that would make it unworkable. 
Mattoon’s national RDF is modeled on the federal unemployment insurance 
pool. Under this federal-state partnership, states that must make unemployment 
insurance payments beyond their own budget capacity are permitted to borrow 
against a pool of funds shared among all the states.108 As we understand Mattoon’s 
proposal, states would apparently form their own RDFs but share the money in the 
RDFs with other states.109 States with lower balances in their RDF would be 
required to make higher annual contributions.110 Withdrawals from the shared RDF 
would be permitted only “when a state’s real revenue growth is negative, or 
unemployment rises by greater than 1% from the previous year or personal income 
growth is negative.”111 States that are forced to borrow from the common pool 
would be required to carry a higher balance in the future.112 A “quasi-governmental 
agency created by the states” would administer the fund.113 
Our first and most significant concern with Mattoon’s proposal is that it seems 
to encourage states to take large risks with their budgeting and even the overall 
management of their economies. Because the proposed fund is a common pool, 
each state faces an incentive to withdraw from the pool before the others. As each 
state recognizes that other states face this same incentive, they will race to get their 
money before the other participants exhaust it.114 Similarly, since the pool is a form 
of budget insurance, there will be moral hazard: states can export some of the 
downside risk of their budget and economic decisions onto other contributors.115  
Mattoon recognizes this moral hazard problem, but his solution does not seem to 
take account of the causes of RDF failure. He argues that increasing the size of the 
RDF balance required for a state after it borrows can serve as a form of “experience 
rating,” in effect gently punishing states that make withdrawals so that they will 
internalize some of the costs of their borrowing.116 The difficulty, though, is that 
the state will incur this penalty years after engaging in whatever risky behavior it is 
that leads to the need for borrowing. If voters or officials are present-biased, as we 
have suggested above, the opportunity to reap current benefits from premature 
withdrawal seems likely to outweigh the distant threat of having to maintain higher 
RDF balances. And, of course, we know that one group or the other is present-
biased. Otherwise we would not need any intervention.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 107. Mattoon, supra note 15, at 3–4. 
 108. See id. at 3. 
 109. See id. at 12. 
 110. Id. at 13. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See id. at 13–16. 
 113. Id. at 17. 
 114. See Pablo Sanguinetti & Mariano Tommasi, Intergovernmental Transfers and Fiscal 
Behavior Insurance Versus Aggregate Discipline, 62 J. INT’L ECON. 149, 151 (2004) (noting 
the “common pool problem” in interjurisdictional fiscal insurance). 
 115. See id. at 153–54. 
 116. Mattoon, supra note 15, at 15–17. 
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Furthermore, Mattoon’s proposal could actually undermine an alternative 
mechanism for containing moral hazard. Any RDF necessarily creates some degree 
of moral hazard, even if it is available only to the state that funded it since the RDF 
by definition is insurance against local economic or budgetary failures. As we have 
noted, however, depleting RDF balances should have the effect of increasing a 
state’s borrowing costs. Thus, to the extent that rating agencies consider RDF 
balances in evaluating state creditworthiness, the increased borrowing costs 
associated with a reduction in RDF balances should operates as a sort of co-pay for 
actors who seek to use up the funds, mitigating the moral hazard problem.117 Under 
Mattoon’s proposal, however, all states would have access to the national pool of 
RDF money, so the reduction in any one state’s balance presumably would have 
only de minimis effects on its credit rating.  
Recent experiences with Mattoon’s model, the federal unemployment insurance 
fund, support our analysis.118 As we have just described, the UI funding closely 
resembles Mattoon’s proposal: both are shared funding pools with only modest 
future penalties for overuse. And, as we mentioned, that structure seems to have 
produced significant moral hazard.  
A final, more general concern we have with Mattoon’s plan is that it does not 
offer a convincing case that states will participate in the shared-pool arrangement. 
The pool requires up-front contributions while promising the opportunity to soften 
recessions at some point in the unknown future, which of course is exactly the 
temporal structure of RDFs themselves. Moreover, it is ambiguous as to whether 
restricting the conditions for withdrawals increases the appeal of RDF 
contributions. On one hand, withdrawal limits might appeal to voters who are 
otherwise reluctant to support contributions for fear that the savings would quickly 
be wasted. On the other hand, officials who prefer to have control over state funds 
would likely favor contributions to a fund with fewer strings attached. Thus, it is 
possible that Mattoon’s plan actually reduces the likelihood that states will save. 
Put another way, we think a basic requirement of any successful plan is that it 
should incentivize savings by present-biased voters, officials, or both. The next Part 
offers some possibilities in that direction.  
III. CONTRIBUTION MECHANISMS 
Having laid out what we regard to be the case for some sort of federal support 
for state RDFs as well as the shortcomings of the sole proposal in this area, we now 
provide a menu of possible policy options. In this Part, we discuss possible 
mechanisms for encouraging state contributions to funds while in Part IV we 
                                                                                                                 
 
 117. See supra text accompanying notes 77–83. Co-pays are a standard prescription for 
reducing moral hazard. See WILLARD G. MANNING & M. SUSAN MARQUIS, HEALTH 
INSURANCE: THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN RISK POOLING AND MORAL HAZARD 31 (RAND 
CORP. 1989). 
 118. Another organization that faces the combined common pool and moral hazard 
problems is the FDIC. Cf. George G. Kaufman, Bank Failures, Systemic Risk, and Bank 
Regulation, 16 CATO J. 17, 23–24 (1996). The FDIC, though, has extraordinary powers to 
investigate and even assume control over insured banks—powers we assume no participating 
state would agree to grant to a federal or interstate agency.  
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analyze methods for preserving the funds until genuine fiscal emergencies arise. 
We expect that deposit and withdrawal devices could be mixed and matched to find 
the most appealing combinations. As we have already noted, the existing literature 
on RDFs provides little basis for certainty regarding the causes of RDF 
underutilization; it would thus be premature for us to argue definitively in favor of 
or against any given instrument or combination of instruments. Therefore, the 
analysis that follows should be regarded as tentative and suggestive. 
A. Mandates Versus Incentives 
We begin by offering a brief explanation for why we believe that any federal 
policy in support of state RDFs should take the form of incentives rather than a 
mandate for states to save.119 Although we recognize that the difference between 
these two approaches is more one of degree than of kind, we believe that outright 
mandates have significant costs that are unlikely to be outweighed by the benefits 
they might offer. 
Perhaps most obviously, a federally imposed obligation to maintain RDF 
balances of a certain size would make it difficult to preserve the diversity benefits 
of federalism.120 Citizens of different states may have varying preferences for 
financial risk-taking and for the timing of their consumption, implying that some 
states may wish to save more than others.121 Similarly, the size of the budget buffer 
a state needs depends on how much the state expects to spend in the future and the 
volatility of the state’s revenue streams.122 States that prefer to spend little, or those 
with revenue structures that do not exhibit much cyclical variability, would need to 
save relatively less than those with larger expenditure obligations or revenue 
sources that drop dramatically in a downturn. Drilling down further still, the 
optimal size of a RDF for any given state may vary based on the likelihood of 
premature raids, a factor that is likely to depend on the political institutions and 
culture of the state.123  
We doubt a federal mandate could do nearly as good a job incorporating this 
variation as state regulations (if properly motivated) could. Even if the federal 
mandate were structured to allow for local variation, federal regulators will likely 
lack information about details such as citizen risk preferences, state officials’ 
expectations about future spending, or state political culture.124 Regulators could 
                                                                                                                 
 
 119. Cf. Gamage, supra note 14, at 766 (noting possibility of an “administrative agency 
requiring surplus revenues to be invested in rainy day funds”). 
 120. For general discussions of the diversity benefits of decentralized policy-making, see 
PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 17–19, 25–26 (1995); Robert P. Inman & 
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Political Economy of Federalism, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC 
CHOICE 73, 83–85 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997); Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal 
Federalism, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1120, 1122–23 (1999). 
 121. See Wagner & Elder, supra note 16, at 461; Wolkoff, supra note 45, at 59. 
 122. See Gary C. Cornia & Ray D. Nelson, Rainy Day Funds and Value at Risk, ST. TAX 
NOTES, Aug. 25, 2003, at 563, 564–66; Joyce, supra note 62, at 68–77. 
 123. Cf. Wagner & Sobel, supra note 63, at 187 (noting that state fiscal institutions 
influence how states spend revenues). 
 124. Cf. Ben Lockwood, Inter-Regional Insurance, 72 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 2 (1999) 
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not expect to get reliable information from state partners because, as we have 
already explained, the state officials’ incentives would be to save as little as 
possible. Partnering with state bureaucrats, who might be somewhat more attuned 
to the state’s long-term interests, could improve the reliability of the information 
exchanged but would also likely reduce its quality, as the bureaucrats are, by 
definition, relatively remote from citizen preferences.125 Moreover, states are 
powerful lobbyists on their own behalf, so allowing for variation might simply 
open the door to states pushing the effect of any savings mandate down to 
meaningless levels.126  
Another problem with a direct mandate is the likelihood that it would distort 
state decisions. A mandate to save is effectively a tax on state revenues. As it is 
well known, taxes can reduce economic efficiency by changing people’s 
behavior.127 For instance, if only states are required to save, state governments 
might shift revenues and programs to the local level or to quasi-governmental 
entities, such as schools and universities, that can raise money through fees rather 
than taxes subject to the savings requirement. If the mandate is broadened to 
include these substitutes, still others might appear; for example, residents might 
simply vote to lower taxes and form private associations, such as charities or gated 
communities, to escape the mandate.128 Even if no substitution at all were possible, 
voters might simply spend less overall—or perhaps would spend the same amount 
but tax themselves more, depending on the relative influence of the income and 
substitution effects of the tax.129 
                                                                                                                 
(claiming that central government will never have information about local preferences and 
policies that is accurate enough to prevent moral hazard). Information is a problem even for 
the task of properly motivating states since, in theory, any federal encouragement like a 
subsidy should be set so that the state will save the optimal amount. See Gamage, supra note 
14, at 766 (noting informational problems in design of RDFs). For this reason, several of our 
proposals emphasize opportunities for the federal government to reveal information about 
state preferences, as we will explain. 
 125. See RONALD N. JOHNSON & GARY D. LIBECAP, THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM 
AND THE PROBLEM OF BUREAUCRACY: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE 2–8 (1994) (discussing incentive structure of administrative officials). 
 126. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why 
State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 861, 
866–67 (1998) (examining the power of intergovernmental lobbying). 
 127. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 280 (5th ed. 1989). For example, suppose the Dude wants to open a 
conventional bowling alley. Conventional bowling is taxed but candlepin isn’t. One possible 
outcome is that the Dude simply abides: he opens a conventional bowling alley and pays the 
tax. But he might also switch to candlepin. In that case, he is bummed, and the government 
also raises no additional tax revenue. The Dude’s bummer is a pure loss of utility for no 
offsetting gain, also known as a “deadweight loss.” Id. at 284.  
 128. See Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowner Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 
1519 (1982) (arguing that private associations can be substitutes for local government); 
Brian Galle, The Distortionary Effects of Subsidies for Charity in a Federal System (Jan. 12, 
2011) (unpublished manuscript) (modeling tradeoff between local government and private 
substitutes). 
 129. The “substitution effect” of the mandate refers to the fact that for any voter, 
spending a dollar on state spending will buy less than spending that same dollar somewhere 
else because a portion is wasted (from the voter’s present-biased perspective). On the other 
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 In similar debates about the best form of regulatory tools for environmental 
regulation, commentators sometimes argue that mandates (as opposed to less 
coercive tools, such as incentives) provide greater certainty of outcomes at least.130 
If the regulator wants to achieve a certain amount of reduction in emissions, or a 
certain savings target, she simply sets that as the requirement and does not have to 
guess about the market’s response to an incentive.131 We think this overestimates 
the certainty of mandates and underestimates the flexibility of incentives. The 
actual outcome of a mandate regime depends on enforcement efforts, lobbying, and 
court battles. Setting a target does not mean states will hit it. And incentive-based 
tools can be continually fine-tuned or even set in advance to vary, depending on 
market response.132  
 One clear advantage we do see for a mandate is that, if designed as a percentage 
of revenues, it is inherently counter-cyclical. That is, as revenues increase, a 
percent-of-revenues mandate would require states to save more.133 When revenues 
decline, however, this form of mandate would demand less savings (or permit 
distributions). This design is appealing because such “automatic” adjustments 
eliminate the cost and delay that come with manual changes.134  
Notwithstanding this minor advantage, the preferred approach in our view 
would be to adjust the incentives of state-level actors so that they can use their 
superior information to set the optimal level of savings for their jurisdiction. Since 
both voters and officials may be biased against savings, we consider instruments 
for attuning the incentives of each group in turn. 
B. Voter Incentives 
As noted in Part II, one possible explanation for the underutilization of state 
RDFs is that voters simply favor current spending (or reduced taxes) over the 
diffuse future benefits of budget stability that RDFs are designed to promote. Our 
first proposal for reaching individual voters, though, targets not voters themselves 
                                                                                                                 
hand, the mandate makes the voter subjectively poorer. Some goods are more or less 
desirable depending on income, which is the phenomenon we refer to when we say “income 
effect.” So if state spending is an “inferior good,” meaning it is more attractive when income 
is lower, then the mandate could increase taxes. But most data indicate that government 
spending instead is a “normal” good for which demand increases with income, and so we 
expect that the mandate would depress state spending. See, e.g., Daniel Hewitt, Demand for 
National Public Goods: Estimates from Surveys, 23 ECON. INQUIRY 487, 496 (1985).  
 130. See William A. Pizer, Choosing Price or Quantity Controls for Greenhouse Gases, 
in CLIMATE CHANGE ECONOMICS AND POLICY 99, 99 (Michael A. Toman ed., 2001); Reuven 
S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon 
Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming Than Cap and Trade, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 
36, 46 (2009). 
 131. See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 130, at 46. 
 132. See Louis Kaplow, Taxes, Permits, and Climate Change (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Res., Working Paper No. 16268, 2010). 
 133. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 
88–89 (5th ed. 1991) (defining countercyclical spending). 
 134. See Christina D. Romer, Changes in Business Cycles: Evidence and Explanations, J. 
ECON. PERSP. Spring 1999, at 23, 37 (finding historical evidence that automatic stabilizers 
were more effective than discretionary stimulus). 
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but instead political “entrepreneurs” and other intermediaries who connect the 
public to their elected representatives. To explain why that is so, we must first 
sketch the difficulties that any subsidy intended for individuals would face, and 
then we detail the mechanisms we think those difficulties require. We then go on to 
describe tools for reaching voters qua voters, using the lessons of behavioral 
economics as building blocks.  
1. Translating Preferences into Politics 
Although local voter preferences may be a root cause of the RDF problem, it is 
uncertain whether federal incentives targeted specifically at those voters could be 
effective. As a general rule, individual voters are rationally ignorant about their 
state’s fiscal decisions, preferring to free ride on the efforts of others.135 Thus, 
political intermediaries, such as entrepreneurs and interest groups, do much of the 
work in transmitting latent public preferences to officials.136 Any intervention 
designed to alter individual preferences will likely succeed only if voters’ more 
benign attitudes towards savings can be translated up through these same channels. 
Historically, direct payments to individuals have motivated those voters to take 
political action, notwithstanding the possibility of rational apathy. Political 
scientists have documented the power of a cash stream in galvanizing 
intermediaries to whip together the political efforts of the beneficiaries.137 Even if 
there is not an interest group in place before the grant is awarded, the receipt of the 
funds makes the selected beneficiaries a discrete and identifiable group; 
entrepreneurs or officials themselves then can organize the group in order to extract 
rewards or “rents” from it in exchange for preserving the flow of money.138 Our 
own earlier investigations into payouts to voters found some support for this story: 
states where taxpayers enjoy a larger federal subsidy via the deduction for state and 
local taxes (“SALT”) typically spend more, suggesting that a federal subsidy 
directed at individuals influences state fiscal behavior.139  
Entrepreneurs and other intermediaries also may be more concerned about long-
term fiscal health than individual voters. The leader of a given interest group is not 
likely concerned about a state’s fiscal standing as a whole because, from the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 135. Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, The Apparent Ideological Behavior of 
Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions, 33 J.L. & ECON. 103, 
103–04, 107–08 (1990). 
 136. Christopher H. Schroeder, Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment—
Explanations for Environmental Laws, 1969-73, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 29, 49–56 
(1998); Richard E. Wagner, Pressure Groups and Political Entrepreneurs: A Review Article, 
1 PUB. CHOICE 161, 164–67 (1966) (reviewing MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965)). 
 137. See Stansel & Mitchell, supra note 16, at 436. 
 138. See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in 
the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 518–19, 547 (1998); George J. Stigler, 
The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). Rents can also 
be extracted from private contractors who are hired to implement the grant program. Daniel 
L. Hatcher, Poverty Revenue: The Subversion of Fiscal Federalism, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 675, 
709–13 (2010). 
 139. See Galle & Klick, supra note 6, at 223–35. 
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perspective of any one interest group, the overall budget represents a common pool; 
stability is still a public good.140 However, the internal rules of the intermediary 
organization can be structured to give its managers incentives to care about the 
long-term health of the organization.141 Nonprofit managers, for example, typically 
have very long tenure in office and derive much of their compensation from 
reputation and personal satisfaction rather than from a share of profits.142 Thus, 
their own success is tied to the continuing vitality of the entity and its 
constituents.143  
At the same time, the literature demonstrates that exit pressures limit the power 
of beneficiaries of government payouts. A state or local-level entitlement program, 
even one that receives federal matching money, might be costly for relatively 
wealthier residents, whose threat to leave if the program grew too expensive would 
be a serious concern for local officials.144 And federally supported programs might 
draw newcomers who would then be entitled to other local programs with smaller 
subsidies (such as education), which could also drive away higher earners.145 The 
combination of these factors is thought to hold down state enthusiasm for 
redistributive programs, perhaps even those with large federal matching 
components, such as Medicaid.146  
                                                                                                                 
 
 140. An exception might be leaders of those special interests that benefit 
disproportionately from public spending, and who would therefore be unable to free ride on 
the stability-defending efforts of others. Teachers’ and other public-employees’ unions seem 
plausible candidates here.  
 141. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, The Separation of Ownership and 
Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 318–21 (1983) (describing how internal structure of 
nonprofits aligns incentives of managers with those of other stakeholders). 
 142. See Bruce R. Kingma, Public Good Theories of the Non-Profit Sector: Weisbrod 
Revisited, 8 VOLUNTAS 135, 142 (1997) (arguing that employee control over the 
organization's mission and services explains empirical evidence of lower wages in the 
nonprofit sector). For a more developed discussion of the motivations of nonprofit 
employees, see Usha Rodrigues, Entity and Identity 23–60 (November 2010) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with University of Georgia School of Law). 
 143. Cf. Bengt Holmström, Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective, 66 
REV. ECON. STUDIES 169, 169–82 (1999) (modeling claim that individual’s desire for 
developing their career can align with interests of firm). 
 144. See Stark, supra note 52, at 1408–10. 
 145. See Edward M. Gramlich & Deborah S. Laren, Migration and Income 
Redistribution Responsibilities, 19 J. HUM. RESOURCES 489, 510 (1984); Paul E. Peterson & 
Mark Rom, American Federalism, Welfare Policy, and Residential Choices, 83 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 711, 725 (1989). 
 146. See Jan K. Brueckner, Welfare Reform and the Race to the Bottom: Theory and 
Evidence, 66 S. ECON. J. 505, 505–25 (2000) (finding some evidence for this effect in 
welfare spending); Craig Volden, The Politics of Competitive Federalism: A Race to the 
Bottom in Welfare Benefits?, 46 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 352, 352–36 (2002) (also finding some 
evidence for this effect in welfare spending); Reagan Baughman & Jeffrey Milyo, How Do 
States Formulate Medicaid and SCHIP Policy? Economic and Political Determinants of 
State Eligibility Levels 15–17 (2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
https://mospace.umsystem.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10355/2393/HowStatesFormulateMe
dicaid.pdf?sequence=1 (finding some evidence that state Medicaid policy is influenced by 
generosity of neighbors). 
2012] BEYOND BAILOUTS 625 
 
Accordingly, an important empirical question in the design of an effective rainy-
day subsidy is the effect of exit pressures on state savings behavior. If exit appears 
to play a large role in creating pressure to spend immediately, then incentives 
targeted generally at all voters will likely have only limited effectiveness. On the 
flip side, incentives targeted specifically at the most mobile citizens might be 
especially cost-effective.  
It may be surprising that state political parties have not already developed as 
intermediaries for state fiscal health. In theory, the parties are repeat players that 
could benefit from reputations for fiscal prudence. The problem, apparently, is that 
modern parties are largely organized and identified according to nationally salient 
issues.147 As a result, at the state level parties do not tend to compete on the basis of 
local policy outcomes.148  
Another targeting issue our analysis raises is that if intermediaries are the 
critical link between voters and state policy, it might be argued that incentives 
should be aimed not at voters but at the intermediaries themselves. We think this is 
a possibility, but the available evidence suggests it might not be a long-term 
solution. The literature on federal grants suggests that local officials understand 
how to buy off interest groups in order to obtain their support. For example, when 
the federal government awards a targeted block grant to a state (rather than directly 
to the individuals within the state), state officials often will choose to spend a 
significant fraction of the grant on the targeted purpose, even though there are no 
genuinely effective legal enforcement mechanisms for requiring them to do so.149 
Commentators argue that, much as in the direct grant story, this may be evidence 
that officials are using the grant dollars to develop and curry favor with the interest 
group that will lobby for additional federal dollars.150 Some studies have found, 
though, that this process is relatively short-lived; it may be that as competing 
interest groups learn about the available funds, they lobby for directing the money 
elsewhere.151  
                                                                                                                 
 
 147. See David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City Council 
Elections?: The Role of Election Law, 23 J.L. POL. 419, 448–59 (2007) (explaining this 
phenomenon in the context of municipal government). 
 148. Brian Schaffner, Matthew Streb & Gerald Wright, Teams Without Uniforms: The 
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Hall, State Supreme Courts in American Democracy:Probing the Myths of Judicial 
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15–22 (1998).  
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 151. Nora Gordon, Do Federal Grants Boost School Spending? Evidence from Title I, 88 
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2. Subsidized Lockboxes  
These observations about intermediaries lead us to suggest that the most 
effective mechanism for deflecting present bias among voters might be subsidized, 
federally enforced lockboxes. In public finance lingo, a “lockbox” is usually a pool 
of money that is set aside under state law for use for a particular purpose, such as 
education or policing.152 As part of a rainy-day subsidy program, the federal 
government could permit a fraction of the subsidy to be set aside in these dedicated 
accounts, to be reserved for targeted future spending. Both targeted and untargeted 
subsidies would be contingent on the state meeting other criteria, such as the 
withdrawal mechanisms we will discuss in Part IV. 
The strength of this approach is that it leverages state officials’ political acumen, 
allowing them to target dollars where they will be most effective. That is, if state 
officials share the federal commitment to long-term stability (either because that is 
their own preference or because additional funds are used to change their 
incentives—about which more will be discussed shortly), they could use 
contributions to these boxes, bolstered by federal money, to buy off those interest 
groups who would otherwise demand immediate spending. Local officials have 
superior information about who those groups are. While the reduced flexibility of 
the locked-up funds would somewhat reduce their efficacy,153 the fact that they are 
reserved for the future would be a significant advance over current practices, in 
which state funds are allocated to interest groups for immediate use.154  
Lockboxes also help to overcome the problem that grant-related buy-outs are 
sometimes short-lived. Again, studies suggest that lobbying by other interest 
groups may in time overwhelm the targeting of a federal grant.155 When moneys are 
legally committed to a fund, though, they of course become harder to divert. In 
other grant situations, there is also a danger of offsetting cuts: officials leave grant 
moneys in place, but slash other forms of benefits to the targeted group in order to 
satisfy demands by others.156 But there is a zero lower bound on offsetting cuts: if 
the grant funds are the only source of spending for the targeted groups, there is 
obviously nowhere else to offset.157 That is largely the case with rainy-day funds: 
savings in most jurisdictions are so low that it is unlikely that lockbox funds could 
be fully offset by cuts in other savings programs.158  
The security of lockbox funds also increases their efficacy in buying off interest 
groups by making it more certain that the promised benefits are actually delivered. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 152. Alasdair Roberts, Lockbox Government: Segregated Funding Strategies and the 
Decline of Governmental Flexibility, 15 GOVERNANCE 241, 251–52 (2002). 
 153. Id. at 259. 
 154. Cf. Douglas & Gaddie, supra note 16, at 23, 26–28 (finding that multiple special-
purpose funds are more difficult to raid than a single pool). 
 155. See Roberts, supra note 152. 
 156. Gordon, supra note 151, at 1772–73. 
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 158. See Gonzalez & Levinson, supra note 9; Gonzalez & Paqueo, supra note 9; 
Marlowe, supra note 9; Sobel & Holcombe, supra note 9; Super, supra note 4. 
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In practice, the fastenings that bind lockbox dollars to their targets are notoriously 
easy to unwind, because the state legislature can usually easily amend or bypass the 
lockbox conditions.159 Even when conditions are hard to change, few have been 
held to be meaningfully judicially enforceable.160 However, if a federal official, or 
other neutral third party, holds the keys to the box instead, then the commitment to 
spend the targeted funds is far more credible. 
3. Other Individually Targeted Payments 
If incentives aimed at intermediaries prove unworkable or politically unsavory, 
subsidies for rainy-day funds could of course always be paid directly to voters. 
Again, one might expect that rationally ignorant voters are unlikely to connect a 
check they receive in June from the federal government with their support in 
November for state officials who made the right decision about an obscure state 
budget line.161 Some evidence (including our own) suggests, though, that these 
mechanisms do have some influence on policy outcomes, probably because they 
indirectly shape the influence and behavior of political intermediaries.162 
With some modifications, an RDF subsidy could follow the pattern of other 
successful efforts, for example by increasing the federal deductibility of state tax 
payments that go toward RDF contributions. Simply expanding the current federal 
tax deduction for state and local taxes would not be ideal, though, because of the 
interaction of that provision with the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT).163 The 
AMT disallows the SALT deduction for taxpayers subject to AMT liability, and the 
likelihood of AMT liability increases with income.164 In effect, the AMT makes the 
SALT deduction more valuable as income declines and vice versa. That is a good 
result when the goal is to induce states to spend more during recessions. But it is a 
bad outcome if the goal is to get them to save. States should be saving more when 
their income increases, and an RDF subsidy that relied on the AMT-limited SALT 
deduction would have the opposite effect. But this could be remedied by amending 
the AMT to allow bonus deductions for a state’s RDF contributions. If that were 
                                                                                                                 
 
 159. Susannah Camic, Earmarking: The Potential Benefits, 4 PITT. TAX REV. 55, 67–69 
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done, we would have the standard case in which deductions are more valuable as 
the taxpayer’s income rises, resulting in stronger incentives to save as the state’s 
economy improves and average income increases.165  
Whether or not policy makers rely on bonus deductibility, any individually 
targeted subsidy should attempt to economize on the federal dollars expended by 
focusing on critical individuals. For example, if the evidence supports the view that 
discontented homeowners are especially influential in states’ savings behavior, then 
subsidies would be most cost effective if they were disproportionately slanted to 
the benefit of those homeowners. Perhaps the subsidy could take the form of a 
federal credit against local property taxes. In addition to reaching a politically 
important population, a property tax credit could leverage the high salience and 
considerable unpopularity of property taxes: relief from the property tax would 
appear more valuable than the equivalent dollar value devoted to unnoticed and 
relatively acceptable levies, such as the sales tax.166  
Other than property owners, though, it is hard to predict which individual voters 
are key to obstructing state savings, which implies that an effective targeting 
mechanism would have to induce voters to reveal their “type,” that is, whether or 
not they are biased against savings. The goal would be to produce a “separating 
equilibrium” in which the incentive itself is only appealing to those who are present 
-biased, so that the people who accept it are necessarily those who would have been 
most resistant to savings.167 For instance, suppose that the incentive payment is a 
small fraction of the state’s per capita savings, but that the voter can access it 
immediately, such as through a debit card, rather than having to wait until the 
following April to claim a tax refund.168 Alternative uses of the state’s money 
would benefit the voter only after some delay: police and teachers must be hired 
and their services parceled out over time, and even cash benefit checks are typically 
spread across the year. A highly impatient voter would discount these future 
                                                                                                                 
 
 165. See Yair Listokin, The Income Tax Code at War with Fiscal Policy: Why Tax 
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services relative to the immediate payment and hence would happily accept the 
immediate payment.  
Subsidies that induce voters to reveal their type might save money in at least 
two ways. First, since the impatient voter has a much higher discount rate than the 
market rate of interest, the accelerated rebate allows the payor to offer a subsidy of 
considerably less than the amount the state will contribute to the RDF. Second, the 
discounted payment helps to reduce the extent to which subsidies would flow to 
inframarginal voters—those who would be willing to support RDF contributions 
even without a subsidy.169 Those with more patience would not find the small 
present payment a worthwhile substitute for benefits that are delayed only a 
relatively short time, but presumably these voters would also be less opposed to 
savings. Admittedly, though, not all voters who are present-biased in their 
preferences for state spending are also present-biased in their personal finances, and 
so alternative targeting mechanisms might be needed to further separate out the 
electorate. 
C. Official Incentives 
1. Matching Contributions to State Funds 
An alternative (and more direct) method of building state RDF balances is for 
the federal government to match state contributions. Matching grants create a 
substitution effect: each dollar of savings costs the state only a fraction of a dollar, 
making savings a bargain compared to other choices.170 As we have explained, one 
reason state officials may fail to contribute adequately to RDFs is because officials 
excessively discount the value of having future fiscal security. The substitution 
effect of the matching grant helps to counterbalance this present bias.  
At the same time, the very fact that matching contributions can only benefit the 
state in the future may make direct grants to an RDF a relatively inefficient use of 
federal money. Again, the only benefits a present official gains from federal 
payments to her RDF are the possibility of future fiscal solvency and perhaps a 
lower immediate cost of borrowed funds. And deferring funds into the future might 
adversely play into the hands of political rivals.171 So each matching dollar the RDF 
                                                                                                                 
 
 169. See MOLLY F. SHERLOCK & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40919, 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE NONPROFIT AND CHARITABLE SECTOR 36 (2009), available at 
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matching grants outperform block grants as a method for changing state behavior. In contrast 
to a matching grant, block grants may simply crowd out deposits the state would have made 
anyway. That is, if I plan to save $100 of my allowance money toward a bicycle, and my 
Aunt Petunia gives me $50 to put in the bank, my rational response is to deposit Petunia’s 
$50, save $50 of my own, and then spend the extra $50.  
  Block grants also strongly resemble a simple federal savings pool in that their size is 
largely uncontrolled by states, leading to the federalism and moral hazard problems we 
discussed in Part II, supra. 
 171. See Wagner, supra note 45. 
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receives is also discounted by present officials, diminishing the substitution effect 
of the match.  
A better “matching” grant to overcome political present bias might be 
unrestricted payouts to states that make their own contributions to a qualifying 
RDF. This instrument resembles the traditional “IRA” many workers use to save 
for retirement: it grants an immediate benefit—in the case of the IRA, a deduction 
from the present year’s taxes—in exchange for the taxpayer’s willingness to defer 
consumption until age fifty-nine and a half.172 Early withdrawals are generally 
subject to a 10% penalty.173 Another form of retirement savings, the “Roth IRA,” 
offers no present savings; both forms of IRA allow savers to defer tax on any gains 
in the money invested until it is spent.174 Relative to the Roth IRA, the traditional 
IRA helps to encourage workers whose present bias would make them indifferent 
to the value of deferral to nonetheless make contributions.175  
In much the same way, a present grant to states based on their RDF 
contributions would be disproportionately valuable to present-biased officials. 
Further, since the value to present officials of higher RDF balances, even if heavily 
discounted, is still likely to be more than zero, the federal grant could be less than 
dollar for dollar and still be effective. Of course, funds granted immediately need 
not be devoted to counter-cyclical spending, and so the immediate grant is less 
efficient in that sense.  
Just as with individual retirement incentives, it might be beneficial for the 
federal government to offer both forms of matching grants and allow states to 
reveal their “type” by opting into one or the other. Immediate matching payments 
could have a lower discounted present value than federal contributions directly to 
an RDF. By definition, present-biased officials view deferred consumption as 
costlier than the market rate of interest, so they will prefer the immediate payment, 
as we have just outlined. Other jurisdictions, however, may be only weakly present-
biased, so that the direct-to-RDF payments will have a higher present value and 
might be sufficient to trigger savings. That would allow both the state and federal 
funds to be devoted to the RDF, increasing the cost-effectiveness of the subsidy. By 
observing state responses and calibrating the payment ratios of the two programs, 
federal administrators could help to trim the amount of money spent unnecessarily 
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to overcome present bias: the central government could offer increasingly steeply 
discounted present payments, but use the alternative of undiscounted direct 
contributions to the RDF as a backstop to ensure that states will still save. 
Direct contributions to RDFs do have one other possible advantage over simple 
cash transfers, but it is not overwhelming. Directing funds to a state’s RDF allows 
the federal government to defer its own payments until the time that the state 
actually would withdraw its funds176—just as a bank account is really only a 
promise by the bank to pay on demand, so that the bank is free to use the money 
elsewhere until the depositor demands it. This is advantageous to the customer 
because the bank has better investment opportunities than the individual depositor, 
and therefore can afford to pay out some of the superior return in the form of 
interest payments. Similarly, if the federal government can make better use of the 
RDF contribution in the time between the state’s contribution and its desired 
withdrawal, then leaving the funds in the general federal treasury increases the total 
funds available to both. But this strategy poses both political and economic risks. 
For one, Congress could renege on its promise to pay. Even if the federal promise 
is somehow insulated from political pressures, the strategy is economically risky, 
because a state’s later demand for RDF funds may coincide with a national 
downturn. That will make it more difficult for the federal government to make 
good on its contribution; moreover, if the withdrawing state is relatively insulated 
from the national recession, federal funds would be better channeled to those harder 
hit.  
2. Let States “Save More Tomorrow” 
Another possible approach to overcoming official present bias would be to turn 
it against itself. This bit of fiscal jujitsu is inspired by Benartzi, Thaler, and 
Sunstein’s work on designing incentives for individuals to save for retirement. 
Individuals who are excessively present-biased are likely to save too little to pay 
for their needs later in life.177 Benartzi, Thaler and Sunstein suggest, among other 
possibilities, that present-bias can be flipped to actually encourage savings through 
their “Save More Tomorrow” Plan.178 Under the plan, workers agree with their 
employers that they will contribute a portion of their paychecks toward retirement, 
but also that contributions will not start until some later date, such as when the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 176. That is, the matching grant paid by the federal government could take the form of a 
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worker gets her next raise.179 Because the pain of savings is deferred into the future, 
it too is subject to a high degree of discounting, making the difference between 
discounted costs and benefits far narrower than “normal” for the hyperbolic 
discounter—enough so that workers offered the Save More Tomorrow Plan in 
Benartzi and Thaler’s study joined in numbers far exceeding those who participated 
in traditional retirement plans.180 
We propose a similar mechanism translated to state budgeting. In order to claim 
its federal subsidy, a state would have to commit to make future contributions to a 
qualifying RDF. Benartzi and Thaler attribute the success of their plan to 
psychological factors such as inertia and excessive risk aversion, but we think it 
also follows from the logic of present bias. Precommitment flips the usual time-
discounting factors: an official can claim immediate rewards, such as credit for 
fiscal responsibility and an improved bond rating.181 But these rewards do not 
require the official to give up any spending on current projects. The price will have 
to be paid in the future, but by then the official may be out of office—or, even 
better, the cost will do political harm to her rivals/successors. The fact that the costs 
of savings will be discounted makes enrolling in the project more appealing for the 
official, just as with the individual saver.182  
At the same time, from the federal government’s perspective, not much is lost 
by allowing the state to defer tending to its RDF nest egg. The goal of the program 
is long-term stability. Deferral increases the chances that RDF funds will be 
inadequate if the next crisis arrives soon, but our aim is not truly the next crisis but 
rather all the crises that will follow. The grant maker will have to enforce the state’s 
promise, but that will have to be done annually for any RDF subsidy scheme once 
payments have begun. 
The Save More Tomorrow Plan also creates additional flexibility in the forms of 
the subsidies the federal government can offer. The promise of future performance 
can be bought with any combination of unrestricted or RDF-matching grants, both 
of which could be either paid immediately or deferred until actual deposits are 
made. We expect that immediate, unrestricted grants would be especially cost 
effective in this setting because of the timing mismatch between the official’s use 
of the money (now) and costs (later). Further, by allowing jurisdictions to choose 
their subsidy the federal government can again sort among those of different time 
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discounts, and with four different instruments rather than only two, the grant maker 
can tune even more carefully to eliminate excess payments. 
Allowing for payments in advance of performance does add an enforcement 
wrinkle. Once the federal funder has invested in the RDF contract, the states will 
have an opportunity to “hold up” the federal government, either reneging entirely 
on their commitment to save or bargaining for more favorable terms.183 A common 
remedy for this hold-up problem in contract law is to give the party that must await 
performance the power to impose fairly draconian costs on the counterparty if they 
fail to perform.184 In this case, depending on the structure of the enforcement 
mechanism, it could be adequate to allow the federal government to penalize the 
state in an amount approximating the amount the state is obliged to save, rather 
than clawing back the full amount of any subsidies to date. For example, the 
subsidy agreement could provide that nonperformance will be penalized through 
reduced federal contributions for other valuable, discretionary state programs, such 
as highway dollars. As long as the expected penalty amount would cost future 
legislators as much as the net cost of savings—the present cost minus discounted 
future benefit—they will have incentives to comply with their commitment.  
3. Competitive Rankings 
Finally, competitive rankings by a neutral evaluator may be a cost-effective 
alternative to cash payments for rewarding officials. As we noted earlier, one 
reason officials may fail to internalize the future benefits of fiscal prudence is that 
their constituents cannot easily observe and reward such behavior.185 Further, if 
voters cannot easily verify the trustworthiness of their officials, they might 
rationally prefer tax cuts to savings during booms. If most public spending is going 
to be wasted by self-serving officials in any event, the optimal strategy might well 
be to simply minimize taxes.186 Thus, providing some assurances of official 
responsibility is important to the incentives of both officials and voters.  
Many officials might claim to be saving prudently, but talk is cheap.187 No 
individual voter would rationally try to verify such a claim, unless she had endless 
free time and a real passion for studying fiscal volatility and the minutiae of the 
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state’s budget.188 Credible verification arrives only long afterwards, when the 
state’s budget either crumbles under the pressure of recessions—or survives.  
Federal officials could overcome this information deficit by rating the 
performance of local officials.189 To give voters a sense of whether their own 
officials’ performance is above or below average, and to spur inter-jurisdictional 
competition, the ratings should actually be rankings: each jurisdiction, and perhaps 
each official, could be ranked according to the prudence of their RDF decisions.190 
Evidence suggests that voters do use the fiscal performance of neighboring 
jurisdictions, where available, to judge their own officials, so this mechanism 
would not be a novelty; it would simply provide better, and more credible, 
comparative data.191 
To be sure, the optimal amount of RDF savings will vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. Any scoring system would have to take into account a state’s actual 
savings needs before judging whether officials have made progress toward those 
targets. More generally, different groups of citizens may have differing risk 
preferences, a factor that is hard to capture with any single index. Dorf and Sabel 
have proposed to deal with this problem (albeit not in the fiscal context 
specifically) through a system of rolling benchmarking, in which localities and 
citizens can participate in the design of the evaluation system, and they can fine-
tune it over time to produce results most useful to their decisions.192 Even if this 
sort of mechanism is not fully effective, we think a certain degree of 
“nationalization” of the rankings is useful. States do not take account of 
externalities in determining how much risk is appropriate; if the rankings are a tool 
for achieving efficient levels of savings, they should at least partly reflect national 
welfare, not simply state’s subjective preferences.  
IV. WITHDRAWAL MECHANISMS  
As we mentioned earlier, studies show that states not only struggle to deposit 
enough money into their RDFs, but also tend to withdraw funds before true crises. 
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Again, early withdrawals are a predictable result of present bias: once the piggy 
bank is packed, the temptation to crack it open is strong.193 Accordingly, an 
effective federal program must not only get money into an RDF but also keep it 
safely there until the time is right. We leave for the work of others the task of 
deciding when exactly are the ideal times to release RDF funds.194 Instead, we 
focus our attention on the problem of getting officials to implement whatever 
optimal spending patterns experts identify. This Part sketches some possibilities. 
First, though, we explain why we reject a solution currently in use by some states. 
A. Mandatory Replenishment 
One tool that several states already use to maintain RDF balances is a mandatory 
“replenishment” rule. Mandatory replenishment, as the name implies, obliges the 
legislature to repay any funds withdrawn from an RDF, usually over a one- to 
three-year period after withdrawal.195 The federal unemployment insurance (UI) 
financing system works similarly: states pay for the UI benefits they provide to 
their own workers, but they can borrow from a federal pool of money if they run 
out.196 However, states must pay back their loans within nine months to avoid 
interest charges and within two years to escape federal penalty taxes on state 
employers.197 Given the familiarity of the repayment mechanism, it might be a 
natural possibility for preserving RDF funds. We think to the contrary, though, that 
experience with replenishment rules and UI federal loans shows that the systems 
perform poorly.  
First, immediate repayment undermines the countercyclical goals of RDFs and 
UI programs. As the recent recession demonstrates, a state that is hit hard enough 
to need extra funds in one year will often be no better off the next.198 In the past 
decade, states that have borrowed from the federal UI fund have had to cut benefits 
and raise local taxes to avoid UI penalty taxes, often while still in the throes of 
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recession.199 Forcing states to make mandatory RDF replenishment payments while 
still struggling to meet other basic obligations does not make sense.200  
Second, and relatedly, replenishment rules reduce the efficacy of RDFs by 
reducing states’ willingness to spend during recessions.201 For a state facing a 
funding gap that spans two fiscal years, an RDF with a quick replenishment rule is 
the equivalent of shoveling snow from one side of the driveway to the other: the 
drift is just as deep, but the shoveler is tired. That is, the state incurs transaction 
costs without gaining any meaningful income-smoothing benefits.  
Both these problems can be mitigated if the repayment problem is stretched or 
deferred until a time when the state’s budget is on a firmer footing. In that case 
there is not much difference between a repayment obligation and a more general 
incentive to contribute to the RDF. So the central weakness of UI repayment and 
mandatory replenishment is that they lack the flexibility to allow states to 
contribute only when contributions make fiscal sense.  
B. An IRA for States? 
Timing is also a significant challenge for another possible withdrawal rule 
modeled on existing programs. Individual savers who take advantage of 
government incentives to contribute to retirement funds typically must pay a 
penalty, usually 10% of the withdrawn funds, if they withdraw before they reach 
age fifty-nine and a half.202 The familiarity of the IRA mechanism is useful, since 
we have significant data on how individuals respond to its incentive structure. 
Accordingly, one tool for maintaining RDF balances might be to define periods of 
fiscal need and to penalize withdrawals from the fund outside of those periods.203  
The familiarity of the IRA model is the good news; the bad news is that the data 
suggest that many households treat their IRAs like a checking account. Early 
withdrawals from IRAs are fairly substantial.204 That should not be surprising: a 
present-biased household will discount the cost of making the extra withdrawal, 
because the household expects to spend the money remaining in the account in the 
future.205 We should expect, then, that a tax on “early” spending, however defined, 
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2012] BEYOND BAILOUTS 637 
 
would be unlikely to deter present-biased jurisdictions from drawing down their 
RDF.206  
It might be possible to design around the gross-up problem, although the 
fungibility of money creates significant challenges. For example, states could be 
prohibited from paying any penalty out of RDF funds. But the state could borrow to 
cover the cost or pay it out of funds that had been ticketed for infrastructure or 
pension contributions, all of which would allow it to trade short-term gain for long-
term cost.207 Prior federal attempts to prevent these kinds of offsetting 
arrangements, often known as “maintenance of effort” clauses, have generally been 
viewed as failures.208  
On the other hand, a federal penalty might be effective as a signaling device to 
voters, akin to the competitive rankings we described earlier. It would, after all, 
amount to an independent judgment that the state’s officials were squandering the 
state’s savings. If officials are largely to blame for states’ present-bias, this signal 
could chasten those officials by giving credence to their political rivals. As we have 
sketched, it is difficult for politicians to claim credibly that they are more fiscally 
responsible than their opposition, but that would be rather less true if one side’s 
claims have the imprimatur of a neutral third party (assuming the federal official 
could herself be seen as genuinely disinterested). Alternately, if voters are the 
problem, it is possible that government suggestions about responsible savings 
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behavior could “nudge” voters in the right direction; that is one interpretation of 
Thaler’s findings on programs that by default channel workers into retirement 
savings programs.209 
As with incentives to save, the penalty could also be more effective if it is aimed 
at interest groups, rather than the public as a whole. Here again the UI federal 
finance system is a possible precedent. States can set their own UI rules, but they 
are subject to some federal guidelines from which they rarely diverge.210 Given the 
strong incentives of most state officials to diverge from their rivals, that uniformity 
is surprising.211 Surprising, that is, unless one knows that failure to satisfy federal 
standards triggers a tax on all state employers equal to about 5% of employee 
wages.212 It is highly likely that the threat of angry political blowback from their 
business communities has compelled state officials to toe the federal line.213  
An RDF penalty system could be designed similarly to the UI system, such as 
by collecting the penalty through reduced federal tax deductions for the state’s 
corporations. That would leverage the disproportionate political power of mobile 
businesses. Since a corporation could presumably avoid a penalty by leaving any 
state that had incurred one, the threat of exit by those corporations would put heavy 
pressure on officials not to incur the penalty in the first place.214  
C. Federal Control 
Taking the IRA model one step further, another policy option would be for state 
funds to be deposited into an account that would be controlled by federal officials. 
States could request payouts, but any withdrawal would have to be approved by the 
federal superintendent. We see several tradeoffs in this approach. 
Most obviously, granting control to federal officials could largely remove 
spending decisions from any state-level pathologies. We say “could” because the 
design of the federal program will determine the extent of its political 
independence. Members of Congress will typically reflect at least in part the 
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present bias of their electorate or local officials, both of whom are important 
sources of political support.215 If anything, Congress is more likely to be present-
biased with respect to an RDF than local officials: by delivering an RDF payout, a 
member can claim immediate political rewards, but she has no control over future 
RDF funds and so likely places little value on them.216 And nationwide fiscal 
stability is a public good, so no individual member has incentives to account 
significantly for it.217 Congress can in turn influence federal agencies through 
oversight and confirmation hearings, budget-setting, and other similar tools.218 
In these respects, the problem of congressional oversight of state budgets closely 
resembles the political economy of congressional management of national fiscal 
and monetary policy. As is well known, the design of the Federal Reserve system 
responds to the potential present-bias of Congress by putting much of the detail of 
macroeconomic policy in the hands of bureaucrats with long terms in office and 
self-sustaining budgets.219 This political insulation frees bureaucrats to pursue their 
institutional mission over a long time horizon.220 A simple solution to the present-
bias problem in RDF management, then, might be to simply assign the task of 
disbursing money to the Federal Reserve. 
As critics of the Fed point out, though, political insulation also has its costs.221 
Obviously, insulation is likely to reduce an agency’s information about popular 
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preferences; only the most motivated groups will actively reach out to agency 
personnel.222 As we have explained, optimal state savings would in part reflect 
local preferences for spending and risk, meaning that if the Fed has inaccurate 
information some states might actually be compelled to save more than would be 
optimal, even taking externalities into account.223 In contrast, the IRA model at 
least allows states to decide when the local benefits of withdrawal might exceed 
any penalty amount, offering an avenue for the input of local preferences.  
A federal-control option might also be more costly than others. One reason 
voters and officials may be reluctant to contribute to RDFs is because they fear 
they will be unable to access the funds when they want or need them.224 A stringent 
RDF withdrawal mechanism might then require a larger incentive payment to states 
to induce them to contribute in the first place. On the other hand, it is also 
theoretically possible that federal control could lower costs by convincing voters 
that their savings will not be wasted by a subsequent coalition.  
D. Federal Enforcement of State Plans 
Yet a third possibility could be modeled on existing methods for regulating 
clean air and water. The Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act allow states to develop 
their own plans for meeting certain pollution-reducing targets.225 The federal EPA 
must approve plans, and states that fail to submit a satisfactory plan are subject to 
direct regulation by EPA.226  
The existing literature thoroughly explores the costs and benefits of the state-
plan approach. By allowing states to take the first steps towards a federal goal, the 
plan reveals some of the state-specific information held by local officials, and it 
allows for innovation and flexibility based on that information.227 At the same time, 
state officials gain somewhat more power to lobby their way around strict 
application of the federal standards. Because the success of the program depends in 
part on states’ contributions, the states gain some hold-up power over the federal 
partner.228 The complexity of the cooperative system may also make citizen 
participation more difficult and officials potentially less accountable.229  
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E. A Note on Triggers 
For any of these options, policy makers will also have to choose how to decide 
when RDF withdrawals should be permitted. In general, the choice is between 
formulas and discretion: should money flow automatically when certain data 
indicators reach pre-determined levels, or should officials decide when to disburse 
funds? Our view is that, in this setting, formulae are preferable to administrative 
discretion, but formulae of this kind are largely untested in the United States. 
We think formulae are more promising in the abstract because of the importance 
of timing to counter-cyclical spending. Discretionary outlays would better capture 
all the nuances of a decision to release funds, such as the size of the current 
recession relative to future possible recessions, the state’s spending needs and risk 
preferences, and so on. But because of the very complexity of such decisions, and 
U.S. law requirements for reasoned decisions in the administrative context, we 
should not expect such decisions to be swift.230 Further, a lengthy deliberation 
creates opportunities for rent seeking by federal officials who control or influence 
the process, meaning that RDF determinations may be used as pork.231 These 
scleroses of the money flow not only reduce its efficiency but also might jeopardize 
its political sustainability, as the experience with the 2009 stimulus suggests.  
In contrast, if funds are released according to formula, there is relatively less 
opportunity for delay, hold-ups, or pork.232 For instance, RDF funds might be 
released to a state when the state’s revenues have dropped by a significant 
percentage from a sustainable baseline, or when per capita income or 
unemployment fluctuates sharply.233 Some of these numbers could be gamed by 
states, though, and others are collected only with some significant lag.234 
Unemployment numbers are gathered pretty swiftly, and so are appealing for that 
reason,235 but unemployment itself is a “lagging indicator” that only imperfectly 
captures the status of a state economy.236 A recent Federal Reserve study proposed 
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instead to use a synthetic measure combining a number of different state 
features.237  
Our worry with any kind of formulary trigger, whether unemployment or some 
other, is that they are largely untested at the federal level for use in combating 
recessions. State experience with formulary access to RDF funds suggests that 
using formulas alone might not be flexible enough to deal with varying state 
needs.238 Federal revenue sharing in the 1970s used an unemployment-rate trigger 
but with a severely flawed design that makes generalizing from its results 
difficult.239 There are only a handful of federal programs that use any kind of 
automatic trigger now, and none of them are designed to function well as a counter-
cyclical tool. Federal education dollars vary based on local spending figures and the 
number of students living in poverty.240 The latter figure derives partly from the 
U.S. Census, which even when supplemented with annual updates obviously 
involves a huge lag time between actual poverty figures and increased federal 
dollars.241 Medicaid funding is based on a complex formula that in part depends on 
a three-year rolling average of a state’s percentage of households living in 
poverty.242 It presents similar lag issues.243 Evidence suggests that Medicaid as 
currently structured does little to smooth revenues across states.244  
 
* * * 
 
Overall, then, there is no easy answer to the design problems faced by RDF 
supporters. Each option has strengths and weaknesses. Further empirical work, and 
perhaps policy experimentation, is needed in order to help decide which trade-offs 
are the most appealing. 
CONCLUSION 
Our goal here has been to offer a set of policy options to help address the 
challenges of state budget stability over the business cycle. The analysis has 
suggested that several alternative policy options deserve consideration as a means 
of providing increased federal support for state budget stabilization funds. Of 
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course, a skeptical reader might reasonably question whether the federal 
government has the political will to undertake any of the reforms we propose. We 
claim no special insight into Congressional politics or the legislative process, but 
we do note that rainy day funds expose no obvious partisan rifts. At one time or 
another, RDFs have enjoyed the support of both parties. In our view, RDFs 
represent a “good government” solution that should appeal across the ideological 
spectrum. While an RDF does permit higher government spending during 
recessions, a well-designed fund also reduces spending at other times. Excess funds 
are channeled into savings for recession fighting, rather than being used to grow the 
size of a government, which many conservative economists believe would be a 
one-way trip.245  
Whatever the U.S. political scene, our hope is that the analysis provided here 
may also be useful in other federations. The European Union, like the United 
States, has struggled during the recent recession with the problem of procyclical 
budget crises in states that can no longer print their own money.246 We have 
focused on U.S. institutions, but much of the analysis can be readily translated to 
the European context. Divergent fiscal and labor policy preferences frustrate 
consensus at the Europe-wide level over how to head off budget crashes,247 which 
suggests to us that a community-wide policy that encourages subnational budget 
stability would be a very useful option. Some recent commentators have suggested 
creating a Europe-wide savings fund,248 but as we noted in our discussion of an 
earlier U.S. RDF proposal, such a shared fund faces serious common-pool 
problems.249 Thus, our suggestions here should be of interest to EU policy makers 
as well.  
In short, we think it vital, and politically plausible, at least to begin a 
conversation about stabilizing subnational finances. We doubt that we have said all 
that could be said on the subject. For example, we acknowledge that another 
approach to the same topic might focus more on the possibility that the federal 
government should seek to credibly promise not to assist states that find themselves 
in need of bailouts, or perhaps might condition such assistance on the states’ 
adoption of a satisfactory rainy day fund. That is a subject for the future. In the 
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meanwhile, we hope our work here will spark research and responses from lawyers, 
economists, and policy makers alike. 
